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ABSTRACT
Recent literature on Latin America has highlighted cases of reform by the region's
governments to increase State regulation of the labor market, offset the detrimental
effects of the so-called Washington Consensus, and promote economic development. In
Guatemala however, the FRG Presidential administration (2000 - 2004) seemed an
unlikely candidate for this task. Linked to the military and marked by a conservative
record, the FRG administration was surrounded by scandals of corruption, poor national
economic performance, soaring crime rates and eroding approval ratings. Surprisingly,
while in power the FRG enacted and implemented the two far-reaching labor reforms that
are the subject of this thesis. The first was a legal reform to the Labor Code and the
second was an administrative reform of the Labor Inspection. Most importantly, the two
reforms sought to increase State regulation over the labor market, and both had
substantial effects in terms of enhanced State regulatory capacity. As the thesis argues,
the FRG labor reforms were possible because, unlike the governments preceding (e.g.
PAN) and following it (i.e. GANA), the FRG was able to exclude the largest private
conglomerates in the country ("the Big Boys") and their followers in the national peak
business organization CACIF from influencing and controlling the Executive branch of
government. In the past, the Big Boys and the CACIF wielded their power in the
Executive to block similar labor reform attempts. Within the FRG Executive however,
the FRG Ministers of Labor, supported by both the FRG Vice-President and the U.S.
Ambassador in Guatemala, could push for the labor reforms without facing the obstacles
that the Big Boys and the CACIF had represented in the past. Additionally, FRG leaders
were eager to use the reforms to target political opponents, expand the party's
constituency, and obtain recognition by the international community. Interestingly, as the
thesis shows, many (although not all) of the FRG reforms survived the transition from the
FRG to the Big Boy and CACIF-friendly GANA government in 2004. The explanation
offered for this seeming paradox rests on an exceptional conjuncture: at the time, the U.S.
Congress was deciding whether to extend free trade benefits to Guatemala under the
United States - Dominican Republic Central America' Free Trade Agreement (US-DR
CAFTA or CAFTA), and one of the main points of contention was Guatemala's poor
labor regulation enforcement record. The GANA party had to show that labor regulation
enforcement in Guatemala had improved and to do so it used some of the FRG's labor
reforms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
0
In January 2004, one of the largest newspapers in Guatemala published a poll assessing
the recently concluded four-year government (2000 - 2004) of the Frente Republicano
Guatemalteco (FRG). According to the poll, 70.4% of those surveyed felt that the
country "had worsened" during the FRG government (Encuesta, January 2004). The
poll's results mirrored the outcome of the 2003 Presidential election which had just taken
place, and in which the incumbent FRG's candidate and leader, General Efrain Rios
Montt, obtained a mere 19.3% of the vote, not even making it past the first election
round.'
The FRG party, deemed "ultra rightist" by Jonas (2000) because of its close relation to
the military, engendered public disapproval from all sides of the political spectrum due to
the widespread charges of corruption against many of its members, the country's poor
economic performance in the early 2000s, and the sharp increase in crime rates between
2000 and 2004 (Beltran and Peacock 2003; Banco de Guatemala 2007; La Encuesta,
Prensa Libre). Additionally, the FRG party's conservative record, epitomized by party
leader and former military dictator General Efrain Rios Montt, did not prevent the FRG
government from constantly confronting the leading family-held conglomerates of the
In Guatemala, elections are usually held in two rounds, unless one candidate obtains more than 50% in the
first round. The second round only includes the top two candidates in the first round.
country and excluding them from Executive decision-making. These conglomerates, the
so-called "Big Boys" (Segovia 2006), had enjoyed clientelistic arrangements with all
governments since at least the return to democracy in 1986. During the FRG
administration, when they did not enjoy these clientelistic arrangements, they found
strong backing against the government in the country's peak business organization, the
Comit6 Coordinador de Organizaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y
Financieras (CACIF). The "Big Boys," also known as the "Pyramid Group" (Valdez and
Palencia 1998) the "Super Dome," 2 the "G-8,"3 or the "GDP Families" because they
control more than 20% of GDP, 4 opposed many of the FRG's economic, fiscal and social
policies, which FRG leaders alleged were aimed at "eliminating the privileges of the
wealthiest," 5 and which contrasted sharply with past governments' Big Boy-friendly
policies. To tarnish the FRG's public image, the Big Boys attacked the government using
much of the mass media which they owned, as well as the peak business organization
CACIF's public declarations.
Surprisingly, despite the public dissatisfaction, confrontations and shortcomings
associated with the FRG government, as well as the conservative record of the FRG
party, the FRG administration did carry out two far-reaching, effective labor reforms
which sought to increase State regulation of the labor market. These reform efforts
2 Interview with Francisco Reyes Lopez, March 19, 2007. The FRG leadership used this term - "Super
Cnipula" in Spanish - throughout the FRG government to refer to the "Big Boys."
3 Interview with Anonymous Labor Lawyer, July 18, 2006 (see Appendix for a list of interviewees). They
are called G-8 because it is the eight most powerful families in the country.
4 Interview with Anonymous Academic 1, July 26, 2006.
s Interview with Eduardo Weyman, July 28, 2006; interview with Anonymous Academic 4, August 11,
2006; interview with Francisco Reyes Lopez, March 19, 2007.
overcame the strong opposition of the Big Boys and their followers in the peak business
organization CACIF.
The first of these reforms was a legal reform to the Labor Code. It was ratified by
Congress in 2001. This legal reform attained four large objectives: first, it legalized
agricultural workers' right to strike; second, it strengthened the Labor Inspection's
(IGT)6 enforcement capacity by endowing it with the responsibility to impose fines on
noncompliant firms, a task which was previously under the jurisdiction of the Labor
Courts; third, it reinforced and streamlined the legal mechanisms governing the formation
and organization of labor unions, largely reducing State interference in union internal
affairs and eliminating cumbersome requirements for union formation; and fourth, it
required the central government to set minimum wages yearly. This legal reform partly
responded to observations made between 1989 and 2001 by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations (CEACR) concerning Guatemala's failure to reform its Labor Code to
comply with ratified ILO Conventions 877 and 98.8 Most of these CEACR observations
concerned the burdensome Labor Code requirements for unionization, as well as the
excessive interference of the government in internal union affairs. However, the legal
reform also included modifications to the law that exceeded the demands of the CEACR,
such as the transfer of the fining capacity from the Labor Courts and Tribunals to the
6 As Piore and Schrank (2006a) explain, "Labor inspection systems in Central and South America are
basically variants of the Spanish model, which originated in France. The Spanish model is a general, or
unified, system: virtually the whole of the labor code is administered by a single agency, the Inspeccion de
Trabajo. The inspectors also enforce various provisions of private collective bargaining contracts."(
http://bostonreview.net/BR31.5/pioreschrank.html)
7 Convention on the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize, ratified by Guatemala in 1952.
8 Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, ratified by Guatemala in 1952.
IGT. Although the former modifications to the Labor Code drew some Big Boy and
CACIF complaints, most of the Big Boy and CACIF opposition centered on the latter
modifications to the Labor Code which exceeded CEACR observations.
The second reform sought to revitalize the Labor Inspection (IGT) of the Ministry of
Labor (MTPS). It was an ongoing effort between 2000 and 2004. This administrative
reform of the IGT complemented the legal reform to the Labor Code and ran along five
axes: first, it increased the IGT budget by almost 40%; second, it raised the number of
labor inspectors by more than 80%, from 160 to 292; third, it created a publicity
campaign to inform workers about their labor rights; fourth, it established two specialized
inspector units for underage, and garment and textile work; and fifth, it institutionalized
an internship program for San Carlos University (USAC) 9 last-year law students to work
in the Ministry of Labor.
The two reforms entailed a series of positive outcomes in terms of 1) worker wages, and
2) the State's regulatory capacity. Regarding the latter, first the value of fines imposed
by the State on firms failing to comply with labor regulation increased more than seven-
fold between 2001 and 2003, from about Q.900 thousand to Q. 7.4 million. Second, in
this same period the amount in fines collected by the State increased by more than twenty
five-fold, from about Q. 50 thousand to Q. 1.5 million. Third, during the FRG
government, the number of cases of firms found in non-compliance settled by the Labor
Inspection (IGT) rose almost seven-fold, from 136 to at least 923 cases. In terms of
9 The San Carlos University (USAC) is the national university. It is also the largest university in the
country, with a student population in excess of 100,000 students.
worker wages, the FRG administration raised minimum wages every year of its term,
increasing the real value of the non-agricultural and agricultural minimum wages by 24%
and 33% respectively between 2000 and 2004. No other administration has ever raised
minimum wages in each of its four years in office.
The enactment and implementation of these two reforms is surprising not only because
they were approved by the FRG administration, but also because they took place in
Guatemala, a country whose weak State is infamous for its inability to uphold labor rights
(Goldston 1989; Frundt 1987, 1998 and 2002; Fuentes 1998; Spohn 2002; Dosal 1995;
Levenson-Estrada 1997; Segovia 2006). In Guatemala, forced labor was legal until 1944
(Dosal 1995; Yashar 1997). Unions were virtually outlawed between 1954 and the early
1980s, and workers faced constant repression from employers and employer-friendly
military governments until the mid 1980s (Fuentes 1998; Levenson-Estrada 1997; Dosal
1995). The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a reduction in the size of the State and its
regulatory role as the Washington Consensus advanced with its penchant for self-
regulating markets. In addition, during the 1980s and 1990s, after the return to
democracy in 1986, Guatemala constantly received international complaints for labor
rights abuse. For instance, one mechanism of international censure was the United States
Trade Representative's (USTR) revision of Guatemala's trade preferences under two
trade programs: the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI). USTR revisions came in response to labor-based U.S. and Guatemalan
group petitions denouncing inadequate labor regulation enforcement in Guatemala, and
placed Guatemala's trade preferences under probation. Between 1986 and 2001, the
USTR revised Guatemala's trade preferences more times than any other Latin American
country's preferences as a result of labor complaints (Frundt 1998).
Thus, this thesis mainly looks at the FRG labor reforms as a case of a weak Latin
American State attempting to strengthen its labor market regulatory apparatus. In this
effort, the State ran into conflict with private sector elites, namely the Big Boys and their
followers in the CACIF. The thesis builds on Polanyi's (1944) work underscoring the
role of the State in preventing the unbridled forces of the market from bringing social
dislocation and the disruption of the fabric of society - what Polanyi refers to as the
second movement of the "double movement." Not only does Polanyi argue that this
second movement is important for the fabric of society, but he also shows that it was
crucial in ensuring the creation of functioning national markets (Chauhdry 1993). The
thesis also looks to complement more recent literature on Latin America focusing on the
region's governments' current push toward increased labor market State regulation not
only to prevent social dislocation following the so-called Washington Consensus (Piore
and Schrank 2006a and 2006b; Murillo and Schrank 2005), but also to promote economic
development by seeking to "reconcile the public's demand for protection with the
market's demand for efficiency" (Piore and Schrank 2006b, 4). As this literature shows,
governments from Mexico to Argentina are carrying both de jure and de facto labor
reforms to enhance the regulatory capacity of the State apparatus in the labor market.
Yet, the FRG labor reforms are also surprising because many of them survived the 2004
replacement of the FRG government with the Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA)
government, despite this latter government's close relation with the Big Boys and their
followers in the CACIF. Although the GANA administration did overturn the IGT
responsibility to fine, and reduced the number of IGT labor inspectors by 13%, from 292
to 258, it also preserved several of the legal and administrative labor reforms. Among the
legal reforms to the Labor Code, the GANA administration did not roll back the legality
of harvest-time strikes, the yearly setting of minimum wages, and the streamlined and
reinforced legal mechanisms governing union formation and organization. With respect
to the administrative reforms, the underage and garment inspector units, the internship
program for last year USAC law students, and several of the public campaign projects
still exist today.
Explaining the Reforms and Their Post-FRG Survival
In late 1999, the FRG government was elected with 68% of the vote in a runoff against
the incumbent PAN party's Big Boy and CACIF-friendly candidate Oscar Berger.10
With this landslide victory, the FRG not only captured the Executive, but also obtained a
majority in the Legislature. Alfonso Portillo became the President of the country in early
2000, and Francisco Reyes Lopez took the Vice Presidency, while Juan Francisco Alfaro,
the leader of the oldest union confederation in the country, the Confederacion de Unidad
Sindical Guatemlateca (CUSG), was appointed FRG Minister of Labor. However, Alfaro
died in 2002, and his place in the Ministry was first taken by Victor Hugo Godoy, a
human rights advocate, and later by Victor Moreira, a former union leader in the
1 Berger ran again in 2004 as the candidate for the new business-friendly party GANA. He won the
election with 54% of the vote.
Electricity Institute (INDE). In addition, the FRG also took control Congress and FRG
leader Efrain Rios Montt became its President in 2000.
Table 1-1. FRG Key Figures
FRG Official Position in FRG Government
Alfonso Portillo President (2000 - 2004)
Efrain Rios Montt President of Congress (2000 - 2004)
Francisco Reyes L6pez Vice-President (2000 - 2004)
Francisco Alfaro Minister of Labor (2000 - 2002)
Victor Hugo Godoy Minister of Labor (2002 - 2003)
Victor Moreira Minister of Labor (2003 - 2004)
Because the Big Boys and their followers in the peak business organization CACIF could
not place their delegates in key governmental and Ministerial positions and did not enjoy
a close clientelistic relation with the FRG leaders, the FRG government (2000 - 2004)
represented a significant break from the past. As explained above, the Big Boys are the
seven or eight largest conglomerates in the country, all of them are family-held and
globalized, depending crucially on international markets (Segovia 2006). The Big Boys
are most heavily invested in agro-industry and industry, including beer, cement, rum,
poultry, and sugar production, but they also hold interests in other economic activities
such as commerce, finance, real estate and services. In addition, the Big Boys still have
investments in the sector where most of them originated: traditional agriculture (e.g.
coffee and sugar cane).
Since the return to democracy in 1986, the Big Boys permeated every Executive:
representatives of the CACIF who were loyal to them and even the Big Boys' own
employees were appointed to various Ministries and government positions. In addition,
the Big Boys had what Segovia refers to as "door-knocker right": they could organize
informal meetings with the highest ranking officials in the Executive to express their
opinions and demands.' The FRG changed these practices, as it excluded the Big Boys
and their followers from the Executive. This thesis refers to this phenomenon as the
shielding of the Executive. The shielding of the Executive led to intense Big Boy - FRG
public confrontations which eventually eroded FRG approval ratings as the Big Boys'
used the mass media and the CACIF's public declarations to tarnish the government's
image. With the transfer of power from the FRG to the GANA in 2004, however, the Big
Boys and their CACIF followers recovered their access to and influence over the
Executive.
Interestingly, the Big Boys have a dual position regarding democracy: one for the internal
politics of the peak business organization CACIF, and another for national level politics.
The Big Boys are highly authoritarian within the CACIF. The CACIF is divided into
sectoral chambers (e.g. commerce, finance, agriculture, industry) and associations (e.g.
sugar, micro-enterprise, non-traditional exports), and in the past chambers and
associations presented strongly divergent positions. However, over the years, as the Big
Boys have increased their economic power relative to the rest of the CACIF members,
the CACIF has become less democratic, since the Big Boys have come to dominate the
decisions of the organization (Segovia 2006). Today, most of the CACIF positions
respond directly to the demands of the Big Boys. This is evident in labor issues, where
the CACIF labor commission, the premier private sector labor representative in tripartite
negotiations with government and labor, bases most of its decisions on the positions of
the Big Boys.
" They also met with high ranking officials in the Legislative and Judicial branches (Segovia 2006).
Paradoxically, at the national level, the Big Boys are die-hard advocates of democracy, as
are most of their followers in the CACIF. Paige (1997) predicted this outcome for El
Salvador as a result of production upgrading from an agrarian base to agro-industry, and
increased globalization of the country's economic elites. Ironically, this author refused to
extend his finding to Guatemala, even though democratization followed a similar path
there as well. Partly because many of their export markets since the mid 1980s have been
contingent on a democratic Guatemala, the Big Boys cannot allow a collapse of
democracy: if the country were to return to authoritarian regimes, many of these markets,
most notably the U.S. market, would be immediately closed to their products.
Additionally, in the past the Big Boys and other economic elites organized in the CACIF
relied on the military - which for all intents and purposes is synonymous with the army
(Schirmer 1998) - to organize armed coups against governments they oppose. However,
starting in the late 1970s, the military and these economic elites steadily grew apart, and
they finally broke their unholy alliance with the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996. In
the Peace Accord negotiations, the Big Boys and their CACIF followers turned their back
on the military, placing most of the blame for the atrocities committed during the war on
the Armed Forces. Furthermore, the Big Boy-friendly Partido de Avanzada Nacional
(PAN) administration (1996 - 2000) drastically reduced the defense budget and increased
civilian control over internal military affairs. This military - Big Boy and CACIF break
cemented the Big Boy commitment to democracy, a commitment which played a central
role during the FRG government: the Big Boys and their followers did not organize a
coup to depose the shielded FRG administration, even though they strongly disagreed
with the administration's policies.
Yet, Paige's (1997) accurate prediction of the establishment of democracy contrasts with
the absent accuracy of his stance on changing labor practices. Paige (1975 and 1997)
argued that the transformation from agrarian production to agro-industrial production
entailed a move from zero-sum to positive-sum relation between employers and
employees: in agrarian production, employers depended on control over land and
peasants to maintain their position, and could not allow labor condition improvements
that could challenge the status quo; in agro-industry, such control was not necessary.
Thus, he predicted that labor wages and conditions would improve following the
upgrading process from agrarian to agro-industrial production. However, even though
the Big Boys and their CACIF followers support democracy at the national level, they are
not open to enhanced public labor regulation enforcement. This became evident in their
opposition to the FRG labor reforms, especially the legal reforms to the Labor Code.
Fortunately, despite their overwhelming economic and political power, the Big Boys
could not penetrate the FRG Executive to block the reforms.
Returning to the FRG administration, the FRG Executive was shielded from Big Boy
control and influence because it successfully formed a coalition that could counterweight
the economic and more importantly, political power, of the Big Boys and their followers
in the CACIF. To do so, the FRG enlisted the support of the military, and what this
thesis refers to as the "renegade" elite. Both of these supporters provided campaign
funds as well as voters, and also staffed FRG government offices. In other words, like its
predecessors, the FRG engaged in clientelistic relations, but it did so with the military
and the renegade elite instead of the Big Boys and the CACIF. The military supported
the FRG for at least three reasons: first, the FRG leader, Efrain Rios Montt, was a general
in the Armed Forces and a teacher to many of the military leaders. Second, the Big Boy
and CACIF-friendly PAN party, the main FRG opposition force and the party governing
the country before the FRG, had negotiated the 1996 Peace Accords which, as explained
above, placed most of the blame for the war atrocities on the military (Beard 200 1)12
while the CACIF, which had been closely allied with the military, emerged practically
unscathed. Third, the PAN administration (1996 - 2000) had also weakened the Armed
Forces by lowering the Ministry of Defense budget and removing some of its leadership.
Thus, with the FRG, the military hoped to regain some of its lost political legitimacy, and
more importantly, increase the budget of the Ministry of Defense, despite directions to
the contrary in the Peace Accords. In addition, the military hoped to maintain its access
to political power through the Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP),13 which the Peace
Accords also stipulated should be dismantled.
Meanwhile, the renegade elite were businessmen who parted file from the Big Boys and
their followers in the CACIF to support the FRG administration. Led by the FRG Vice
President Reyes Lopez, a truck company owner, the renegade elite also included a
wealthy banker; the country's second largest fertilizer importer; and the owner of almost
12 Interview with Anonymous Academic 2, July 19, 2006.
13 A military structure supposedly in charge of the President's security. However, many of its members
were accused of serious human rights violations during and after the Civil War (1960 - 1996). The military
strongly opposed dismantling this structure (Beltran and Peacock 2003).
all the television channels in Guatemala, among others (Palencia 2002). This renegade
elite had at least three characteristics that distinguished it from the Big Boys and their
followers: first, they were "self made men" (Cammett forthcoming) in the sense that they
did not belong to the traditionally powerful families of Guatemala; second, some of them
had links to the military, for instance Vice President Reyes Lopez, was a former military
man; and third, some of them were involved in illicit activities (Palencia 2002).
However, the deeper division between the Big Boys and their followers on the one hand,
and the renegade elite, on the other, revolved around status: the Big Boys and their
followers in the CACIF looked down on the renegade elite as a second-class elite because
of the latter's non-oligarchic, military- linked background and illicit dealings. Thus, the
renegade elite saw the FRG government as an opportunity for enrichment that could
circumvent the entrenched and much greater power of the opposing Big Boys and their
followers. They hoped to obtain Ministry positions, government contracts and beneficial
tariffs, among other privileges, from the FRG administration.
The importance for this thesis of the FRG's ability to form an alternative coalition in
order to exclude the Big Boys from the Executive rests on the Big Boys and their
followers in the CACIF's traditional opposition to labor reforms such as those of the
FRG. In the past, representatives of the Big Boys and the CACIF in the Executive could
consistently block labor reform attempts in order to keep the Guatemalan State weak and
unable to regulate the labor market. For instance, many times labor reform discussions
took place in tripartite commissions where the CACIF labor commission - the body
traditionally representing the Big Boys and their followers - union members and
government reached "agreements" on labor conditions, regulation and enforcement.
Nonetheless, since they were permeated by Big Boy and CACIF-friendly officials,
previous governments always sided with the CACIF labor commission to the detriment of
unions. With the FRG administration, however, the Big Boys and their followers did not
have direct control over Ministers and other key FRG Executive figures, and thus could
not prevent the shielded FRG Executive from enacting and finally implementing the legal
and administrative labor reforms.
More concretely, the FRG exclusion of the Big Boys from the Executive allowed labor-
friendly FRG Labor Ministers Alfaro, Godoy and Moreira, with the strong backing of
Vice President Reyes Lopez, to advance in their reform efforts. Much of the literature on
bureaucracies indicates that embedded, Weberian bureaucrats are of integral importance
in reform processes (Evans and Rauch 1999; Evans 1989). In Guatemala, two of the
Ministers, Alfaro and Moreira, were embedded in the labor movement, since they came
from the labor union sector. The third Minister, Godoy, had a history as a human rights
advocate. Additionally, the three Ministers of Labor had long careers and were highly
experienced in labor issues, thus enjoying Evans' (1989) Weberian characterization.
Within the Executive, and later in the Legislature, they succeeded in garnering enough
support for their reforms, partially corroborating the literature claims. At the same time,
as the FRG labor reforms show, such embedded, Weberian Ministers, although
important, are not enough to enact and implement a reform. This thesis claims that the
FRG Ministers of Labor succeeded in their efforts because they were working within an
shielded Executive where the Big Boys and their followers had little room to block them.
As in the case of the Labor Ministers, the FRG's exclusion of the Big Boys from the
Executive enhanced the U.S. government's influence on Guatemalan national labor
policy. The U.S. government relied on the threat of trade sanctions to influence
government policy. Much of the literature on Latin American labor draws a direct
connection between U.S. trade sanctions and labor condition improvement (Frundt 1998
and 2002; Ambruster-Sandoval 1995). However, as this thesis argues, for U.S. trade
pressure to be most effective at the national level, it must traverse domestic government
channels (i.e. the Minister of Labor, Congress, and the Executive) whose openness varies
from administration to administration: the presence of the Big Boys in the Executive
usually narrows these channels, as they oppose "imperialist" interventions seeking to
enhance labor market regulation by the State. Thus, labor improvements do not follow
automatically from trade pressures: domestic political conditions mold the effects of
these pressures. During the Portillo administration, channels that U.S. government trade
pressures could traverse were more open because there were labor-friendly Ministers of
Labor working within an Executive that did not suffer from the constant influence and
control of the Big Boys and CACIF. In fact, the FRG Labor Ministers and Vice President
used the threat of U.S. trade sanctions to garner support for the reforms within the
Executive, and more importantly, in Congress. Therefore, the effectiveness of U.S.
pressures was enhanced by the FRG's exclusion of the Big Boys and the CACIF from the
Executive.
It is also important to note that the FRG supporters - the military and the renegade elites
- did not oppose the reforms. The military remained neutral with regard to the FRG
labor reforms for at least three reasons: first, the reforms targeted the urban, not the rural,
workers. During the Civil War, most of the military repression took place in rural areas
against Indigenous peasants, where the military strategy envisioned control over the
population as the way to defeat the guerrillas. But urban areas were under much less
military control, and thus the military was not as sensitive to reforms that potentially
enhanced worker mobilization in these areas. Second, important factions within the
military supported a limited redistribution of resources as a way to prevent any type of
"Communist" uprising. As these military factions reasoned, much of the past guerrilla
mobilization responded directly to Guatemala's high levels of inequality. This doctrine
underpinned the policy decisions of some of the military governments of the 1970s and
1980s, most notably the governments of Kjell Laugerud (1974 - 1978) and FRG leader
Efrain Rios Montt (1982 - 1983). Third, the military was unaffected by the reforms, as a
completely different set of labor regulations prevails within the Armed Forces.
Similarly, the renegade elite chose not to oppose the reforms for at least two reasons:
first, the FRG government selectively used the reforms to target the Big Boys and their
followers in the CACIF, creating an advantage for the renegade elite, which did not have
to worry about increased labor costs. As several interviewees declared, the FRG
government many times used the IGT as a political weapon against its opponents, most
importantly the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF. The second reason why the
renegade elites supported the reforms was because many of them were involved in .
industries with low labor intensity. Thus, the reforms did not significantly affect the
renegade elite's cost structures even if the reforms' enforcement had been targeted
toward them.
Therefore, the FRG's exclusion of the Big Boys and CACIF from the Executive explains
the administration's ability to enact and implement the legal and administrative labor
reforms. Within this shielded FRG Executive, labor-friendly Ministers of Labor, with the
support of the Vice President and the U.S. embassy, could garner the necessary support
for the reforms, while the Big Boys and their followers stood by helplessly. The result of
this Executive shielding was the far-reaching legal and administrative labor reforms to
the Labor Code and the Ministry of Labor's (MTPS) Labor Inspection (IGT).
The election of the Big Boy and CACIF -friendly GANA party in 2004 appeared to
signify the demise of the FRG labor reforms, but the actual experience under the GANA
proved skeptics partially wrong. Although the GANA administration did limit the
coercive regulatory capacity of the IGT, it maintained many of the other FRG reforms.
Much of the GANA administration's decision not to overturn all the reforms rests on the
exceptional political conjuncture: at the time, the U.S. Congress was debating whether to
approve the United States - Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade Agreement
(US-DR CAFTA or CAFTA), and the U.S. government and Congress placed much
attention on labor conditions in Guatemala. Most importantly, U.S. labor unions,
consumer groups and business associations were actively lobbying U.S. Congressmen to
block the agreement, focusing much of their anti-CAFTA campaign on Guatemala's poor
labor rights protection record. Therefore, the GANA administration had to stop short of
overturning all the FRG labor reforms. Indeed, it even used some of the FRG labor
reforms as proof to the U.S. government and Congress that labor conditions and labor
regulation enforcement in Guatemala had improved.
Thesis layout
This thesis begins by examining the path of enactment and implementation of the FRG
labor reforms. Chapter Two presents the reforms and their different characteristics, also
describing the actors involved in their planning and negotiation. Negotiations among
these actors mostly surrounded the legal reform to the Labor Code requiring Executive
and Congressional approval. These negotiations took place both within the FRG
administration, and also between the FRG administration and the Big Boys and their
followers represented by the CACIF labor commission. Labor unions organized into two
large confederations, the Unidad de Acci6n Sindical y Popular (UASP) and the Uni6n
Guatemalteca de Trabajadores (UGT), and the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala also played
an important role in the negotiations. On the other hand, the administrative reforms only
involved the Executive and not Congressional approval, and thus required much less
negotiation.
Within the FRG administration, negotiations concerning the legal reform to the Labor
Code took place between the camps of the two FRG strong men: President of Congress
Efrain Rios Montt, and Vice President Francisco Reyes Lopez. A third FRG leader,
President Alfonso Portillo, lost much of his power to Reyes Lopez early in the FRG term
and held little sway in the negotiations. Vice President Reyes Lopez, who held most of
his power within the Executive, where he appointed Ministers and Vice Ministers loyal to
him, supported a legal reform proposal to the Labor Code which exceeded the
requirements of the observations which the International Labor Organization's (ILO)
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
(CEACR) had been making since 1989. Among his loyal Ministers were Juan Francisco
Alfaro, the first FRG Labor Minister (Minister from 2000 - 2002); and Victor Moreira,
the third FRG Labor Minister (Minister from 2003 - 2004). Alfaro initiated the legal
labor reform process, while Moreira accelerated the administrative reforms to the IGT.
Straddling the terms of Alfaro and Moreira was Minister Victor Hugo Godoy (Minister
from 2002 - 2003), who Vice President Reyes Lopez quickly removed from his position
after only one year because of Godoy's loyalty to President Portillo and not to him.
Meanwhile, Rios Montt controlled an obedient Congressional majority which "was not
subordinate to the Executive." 14 Unlike Reyes Lopez, Rios Montt was much more
hesitant about the Executive's legal labor reform proposal exceeding the CEACR
observations, fearing the opposition of the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF.
Therefore, Chapter Two describes how the Executive and Legislature led by Reyes Lopez
and Rios Montt respectively, negotiated and finally came to an agreement - with the
important intervention and support for the reform of the U.S. government represented by
its ambassador Prudence Bushnell - on the legal reform to the Labor Code. As described
above, the legal reform finally exceeded the CEACR observations. The Chapter also
14 Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 16, 2006.
describes the process of administrative reform to the IGT which was internal to the
Executive and thus involved less negotiation between the two FRG strong men.
Furthermore, Chapter Two examines the legal reform negotiations between the FRG
government and other important actors, most significantly the CACIF labor commission
representing Big Boys and their followers. Even though the CACIF labor commission
had previously refused to reform the Labor Code to comply with the ILO's CEACR
observations, it chose to support a legal reform fulfilling these observations after the
election of the FRG. The explanation for this decision rests on the CACIF labor
commission's awareness of the FRG's intent to push for a reform with or without Big
Boy support. At the very least, the CACIF labor commission wanted to have a say in the
reform. Thus, it chose to propose a labor reform adhering strictly to the CEACR
observations with the mistaken expectation that this alternative would stymie the FRG
Executive's intention of enacting and implementing a legal reform which not only
fulfilled the CEACR observations, but also exceeded them. However, as the Chapter
describes, this CACIF labor commission's effort did not prevent the FRG Executive from
obtaining Congressional ratification for its broader legal reform to the Labor Code.
Lastly, Chapter Two examines how the successor government of the FRG government
(2000 - 2004), the Big Boy and CACIF-friendly GANA administration (2004 - 2008),
did not overturn all of the labor reforms of the FRG. As explained above, the GANA's
decision was a result of the U.S. Congress' CAFTA discussions and the intention of the
GANA administration to show that labor conditions and labor regulation enforcement in
Guatemala had improved.
Chapter Three then turns to an explanation of why the labor reforms were enacted and
ratified by the FRG administration, and why they took the characteristics described in
Chapter Two. The chapter describes the importance for the reforms of the FRG's
exclusion of the Big Boys and CACIF from the Executive. As the chapter explains, this
shielded FRG Executive came as a result of renegade elite and military support. The
chapter also looks at the enhanced role of the FRG Labor Ministers and U.S. Ambassador
within this shielded FRG Executive. Finally, the chapter examines the opposition to the
reforms of the Big Boys and their followers, but also underscores their unyielding
commitment to democracy as a crucial reason behind the success of the FRG reforms'
enactment and implementation process.
Final Note
It is important to underscore that this thesis is not a defense of the FRG administration or
of its leader, General Efrain Rios Montt. Neither does it attempt to defend or criticize
any other government before or after the FRG administration. Instead, this thesis simply
attempts to faithfully describe the two labor reforms of the FRG administration, and to
provide an account for their timing and direction.
A few months ago, while I was explaining the FRG labor reforms as positive, impressive
advances in Guatemala's labor history, a family member interrupted me and asked, "For.
whom were the FRG labor reforms a positive, impressive advancement, for workers or
for employers?" I had asked myself this question several times before then, and it
seemed that the natural answer was that they favored labor, something which my family
member, himself a businessman, seemed to assume. However, as I explained to him, I
believe that the significance of these reforms lies beyond this labor versus capital debate:
their significance is found in their enhancement of the State's capacity to enforce labor
market regulation, as I explained to my family member, "in their reinforcement of the
rule of law in Guatemala." This advancement, I believe, is beneficial to both labor and
capital in the path to economic development.
Chapter 2
Enacting and Implementing Labor Reforms:
The Legal Reform to the Labor Code and the Administrative Reform of the
Labor Inspection
0 0
In 1989, the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) submitted its first
observations on Guatemala's status regarding two of the country's ratified ILO
conventions: 87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize,
and 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining. The CEACR observations
addressed the burdensome requirements for unionization of the country's Labor Code,
especially in terms of the requirements to form a union committee and call a strike;
underscored the excessive "supervision of trade union activities by the Government"
(CEACR Observations 1999); and demanded the legalization of harvest-time strikes for
agricultural workers. The CEACR submitted the same observations year after year
throughout the 1990s. 15 However, until 2001, no Guatemalan government seriously
addressed them. 16
"5 The ILO's CEACR made the same observations in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998,
1999, 2000 and 2001 (ILO).
16 Some of the CEACR observations were partially addressed by a 1992 legal reform to the Labor Code.
However, as Frundt (1998) explains, these reforms were not enforced. The next chapter returns to a more
detailed description of the 1992 legal reforms.
In 2001, the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) administration (2000 - 2004)
finally enacted and implemented a substantial legal reform to the Labor Code which not
only fulfilled most of the CEACR requirements, but more importantly, exceeded them by
addressing issues concerning State labor regulation enforcement and minimum-wage
setting. 17 The main thrust for the legal reform came from a weak Executive which,
among other things, sought to strengthen its labor market regulatory apparatus. In the
previous two decades, the Washington Consensus had limited the State's regulatory
capacity, allowing the unbridled forces of the market increase social dislocation and
inequality. It was the weakened Executive produced by the Washington Consensus - an
Executive which in 2001 was under the control of the FRG party - which led the push for
the legal labor reform that fulfilled and exceeded the demands of the CEACR
observations, and increased the State's regulation of the labor market. Instrumental in
this Executive push were Vice President Juan Francisco Reyes Lopez and Minister of
Labor Francisco Alfaro. To obtain ratification by Congress of the legal reform to the
Labor Code, the FRG Executive had to overcome the opposition of the Big Boys, the
largest conglomerates in the country, and their followers organized in the peak business
organization Comite de Organizaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y
Financieras (CACIF).
17 The Executive's defense of the reform also emphasized the role it played in satisfying the requirements
set forth by the Peace Accords, specifically by Accord Number 26 on Socioeconomic Aspects and the
Agrarian Situation. The two requirements cited by the Executive were to punish legal violations with
severity, and to make the imposition of fines effective on those who fail to comply with the labor regulation
(Expediente Decreto 18-2001). In its reform defense, the Executive received support from the Special
Representative of the United Nations General Secretary to Guatemala in a letter sent to Minister Alfaro on
May 8, 2001 (Expediente Decreto 18-2001). CACIF also recognized the importance of the Peace Accords
in a law initiative it presented entitled "Redacci6n que satisface los Requisitos de la OIT y los Acuerdos de
Paz" (May 10, 2001).
In addition, the FRG Executive also implemented an administrative reform to revitalize
the Labor Inspection (Inspeccion General del Trabajo, IGT) of the Ministry of Labor
(Ministerio de Trabajo y Prevision Social, MTPS). This administrative reform
complemented the legal reform to the Labor Code. The central objective of this
administrative reform was to enhance the IGT's capacity to enforce the new legislation.
The path of labor reform enactment and implementation determined the number of
required negotiations. Both reforms emerged without much negotiation from within the
FRG Executive, where the Big Boys had no representation and thus could not block the
reforms: the FRG was the first government since at least the return to democracy in 1986
in which the Big Boys had no Ministers or high-placed officials favorable to them and no
direct channels of communication - what Segovia (2006) calls the "door-knocker right" -
to contact government officials to ensure satisfaction of their demands. Since the
administrative reform of the IGT only required Executive approval, the Big Boys and
their followers had little room to block the reform. However, in the case of the legal
reform to the Labor Code, which unlike the administrative reform also required
Legislative approval, the Big Boys and their followers held influence in different parties
and commissions represented in Congress and used these channels in an effort to block
them. With that said, the Big Boys and their followers also found other ways to limit the
effects of the administrative reforms, most directly by shirking the new regulations and
refusing to comply with the IGT.
The two labor reforms yielded substantial results. This chapter examines the effects of
the reforms in two areas: 1) worker wages and collective rights, and 2) the State's
regulatory capacity. As it concludes, the two labor reforms yielded substantial results,
especially in terms of the capacity of the State to enforce labor regulation. In terms of
State regulation enforcement, for instance, fines collected from noncompliant firms
increased from about Q. 53 thousand to Q. 1.5 million between 2001 and 2003.
Similarly, settled cases of firms found in noncompliance with labor regulation rose
substantially from 136 to 923. With regard to worker wages and collective rights,
minimum wages increased by 24% and 33% for the non-agricultural and agricultural
sectors respectively.
Surprisingly, most of the FRG's legal and administrative reforms survived after the
transition from the FRG administration to the Big Boy and CACIF-friendly Gran Alianza
Nacional (GANA) government in 2004, where once again the Big Boys were directly
represented by government officials. As the last section of this chapter explains,
although the GANA did overturn some of the FRG labor reforms, most notably
restricting the IGT's fining capacity, it could not overturn all the reforms. This GANA
decision directly responded to the impending U.S. Congress decision on whether to ratify
the United States - Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade Agreement (US-DR
CAFTA or CAFTA), a decision which partly hinged on Guatemala's labor regulation
enforcement and labor conditions record.
The Legal Reform to the Labor Code
As Murillo and Schrank (2005) argue, over the past few years many of Latin America's
labor codes have been reformed so as to make them more favorable to labor. As these
authors explain, quoting Ruth Berrins Collier and David Collier (1979), labor codes are
noteworthy because they provide "a highly visible and concrete policy statement around
which political battles are fought, won, and lost, and around which political support is
attracted, granted, and withheld" (Murillo and Schrank 972 quoting Collier and Collier
971). Meanwhile, Piore and Schrank (2006a) argue that "the labor law reforms
anticipated by proponents of the Washington Consensus have not only been 'limited to a
few countries'... but have arguably been more likely to expand rather than curtail the
scope of worker protection," leading "many countries to rededicate themselves to labor-
law enforcement." As the claim, the results of these efforts have been "neither trivial nor
cosmetic" (Piore and Schrank 2006a, http://bostonreview.net/BR31.5/pioreschrank.html).
In Guatemala, the FRG legal reform to the Labor Code came in two phases. In a first
phase, the FRG Executive and the FRG-controlled Legislature cornered the Big Boys and
their followers, who had always opposed such labor reforms and who were represented
by the peak business organization CACIF's labor commission, into participating in the
reform negotiations. The CACIF labor commission, comprising lawyers and
businessmen, was the traditional private sector representative body in tripartite labor
negotiations. The FRG government presented the Big Boys and their followers
represented by the CACIF labor commission with two options: they could participate in
the tripartite negotiations and have a voice in the legal reform to the Labor Code seeking
to address the CEACR negotiations, or they could simply watch as the FRG Executive
implemented its own reform. Additionally, the FRG administration included the largest
union confederations, the Union Guatemalteca del Trabajo (UGT) and the Unidad de
Accion Sindical y Popular (UASP) in the negotiations. Together, the CACIF labor
commission and the unions submitted a legal reform proposal approved by Congress as
Decree 13-2001. The Decree centered on facilitating the formation and organization of
unions.
However, because Decree 13-2001 only addressed some of the CEACR observations, the
FRG Executive proceeded unilaterally with a second phase of legal reform. In this
second phase, the FRG Executive presented a proposal that not only addressed the
remaining CEACR observations, but more importantly improved the State's tools to
enforce labor regulation and set minimum wages yearly. The FRG Executive proposal
obtained Congressional ratification as Decree 18-2001, despite Big Boy and CACIF
opposition.
Decree 13-2001
On May 17, 2001, the FRG-controlled Executive, through newly elected President
Alfonso Portillo, submitted a Labor Code reform initiative to Congress 18 which sought to
change forty Labor Code articles. In addition to the CEACR observations, it included
other important revisions to the Labor Code, such as the transfer of fining responsibilities
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from the Labor Courts to the Ministry of Labor's Inspection (Portillo, 2000).19 Until
then, inspectors presented their reports of noncompliant firms to Labor Courts which
would then determine whether firms were in fact breaking the law, and if so, how much
they should pay in fines. Virtually all sectors of society agreed that this fining process
was slow and inefficient (Spohn 2002; Expediente Decreto 18-2001).20 In defense of the
fining capacity transfer from the Labor Courts to the IGT, the draft initiative argued that
"the procedure proposed is contemplated in Convention 129 of the
International Labor Organization (ILO), which is a law for Guatemala because
it was ratified by the Guatemalan Congress in 1972, and which explains in one
of its articles that persons who violate or fail to comply with the legal
dispositions under the supervision of the labor inspectors, must be submitted
immediately, without previous notice, to a judicial or administrative
procedure..." (Expediente Decreto 18-2001, 24; italics added).
The Executive's reform initiative was enacted by newly appointed Minister of Labor Juan
Francisco Alfaro with the acquiescence of Vice President Francisco Reyes Lopez after
the Minister negotiated it with unions (Portillo, 2000).21 The main Big Boy labor
representatives, the CACIF labor commission, did not partake in the negotiations. The
Big Boys and their followers were boycotting all tripartite committees following the FRG
government's unilateral decision to increase minimum wages on January 26, 2000
(Spohn 2002; Banco de Guatemala).
After receiving the Executive's Labor Code reform initiative on May 17, 2000, an FRG-
controlled Congress presided by FRG leader Rios Montt debated it on June 7, 2000. Due
19 As Spohn explains, the judicial procedure involves the Labor Courts, while the administrative procedure
involves the Labor Inspection (Spohn 2002).
20 Interview with Alejandro Argueta, August 8, 2006; interview with Ricardo Changala, July 13, 2006;
interview with Francisco Mendoza, July 14, 2006; interview with Anonymous Labor Unionist 7, July 19,
2006; and interview with Carlos Arias, July 31, 2006.
21 Interview with Francisco Reyes Lopez, March 19, 2007; and interview with Anonymous FRG Minister,
March 16, 2007.
to technical errors, however, it was quickly removed from Congressional consideration
on that same day (Expediente Decreto 18-200 1).
The Executive's effort, nonetheless, was not lost on the Big Boys and their followers,
who realized that the FRG Executive would push for substantial labor reforms with or
without their consent. In addition, as the Big Boys and their followers knew, Minister
Alfaro was drafting a new reform initiative that closely resembled the one rejected by
Congress. Thus, in September 2000, the representative body on labor issues of the Big
Boys and their followers, the CACIF labor commission, returned to the tripartite
bargaining table, a Labor Ministry body designed for government - union - private sector
negotiations.
The Big Boys and their followers, represented by the CACIF labor commission, did not
support the first reform initiative that the Executive had sent to Congress in May of 2000,
and sought to negotiate a new one with the union sector. They believed that the most
viable strategy, given the resolute position of the FRG government on the labor reform,
was to present a less demanding Labor Code reform proposal than that of the FRG. As
the Big Boy representative CACIF labor commission calculated, their alternative
proposal would quell the FRG's labor reform "hunger." In this effort however, obtaining
the allegiance of an independent but weak labor union sector through bipartite
2 As Mendoza (2005) argues, currently there are 1541 registered labor organizations in the Ministry of
Labor, with 804 of them currently active. Of them, less than 200 are found in traditional enterprises or
economic sectors, as most of these labor organizations are found in the private sector or among independent
workers. Additionally, the author explains that the official rate of unionization is between 2% and 4% of
the employed population.
negotiations was crucial as it would present an apparently united front against the FRG
proposal. As Guido Ricci, a leading member of the CACIF labor commission noted,
"the political environment demanded [that we return to the bargaining table].
It was a completely adverse government that was willing to pass the reforms
at their pleasure regardless of the CACIF position. Given the situation, the
only tool left was to go for a bipartite agreement that would take the Executive
out of the game and place the CACIF in direct negotiation with the workers...
The idea was to deliver a final product based on a consensus, a product that
reflected the desires of the people based on the participation of employers and
workers, and that therefore would be difficult to reject by the Congress.
Congress had to respect it."23
Pressures by the United States Trade Representative (USTR)24 also played an important
role in the Big Boys' representatives' return to the bargaining table. Because the USTR
was expected to announce whether it would review Guatemala's trade preferences under
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) trade
programs in October 2000, the Big Boys and their followers worried about losing the
country's benefits under the two trade programs: if after the review, the USTR found that
Guatemala was not enforcing labor regulation, he could exclude the country from the
GSP and CBI. They also feared that the Executive would take advantage of the crisis
created by the USTR pressures to move Minister Alfaro's reform initiative through
Congress. As the CACIF labor commission representative Ricci continued,
"There was an important risk of losing GSP and CBI [trade] benefits... So, on
the one hand, we had the GSP pressure, but we also had the pressure of
[reacting to] an opposing, highly antagonistic government. The only way out
was to negotiate with the workers in order to force the Congress to respect
what the people demanded."26
23 Interview with Guido Ricci, August 25, 2006.
24 At the time, the USTR was Robert Zoellick.
25 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation of this revision procedure.26 Interview with Guido Ricci, August 25, 2006.
As many expected, in October 2000 the USTR decided to place Guatemala's
GSP/CBI trade preferences under revision. The USTR gave the government of
Guatemala until the end of April 2001 to address the CEACR observations.
Between the USTR's October 2000 decision and March 15, 2001, the CACIF labor
commission and representatives of the two largest unions in the country, the UASP
and UGT, negotiated, but the two parties could not reach an agreement on how to
reform the Labor Code to address the CEACR observations. In light of this
impasse, the Executive presented Congress with a second initiative of reforms on
March 15, 2001 (Expediente Decreto 18-2001).7 Like the first reform initiative,
this second initiative was drafted by Minister Alfaro with the support of Vice
President Reyes Lopez. It was very similar to the first initiative that the Executive
had presented to Congress in May 2000. As the first reform initiative, this second
initiative went beyond addressing the CEACR observations, focusing on issues of
labor regulation enforcement and minimum wages setting.
The Executive's second reform initiative encountered strong opposition from both
the Big Boys and their CACIF followers and, ironically, the unions. Unions felt
that it did not fulfill the demands that they had negotiated with the Minister in early
2000, especially those concerning strikes in the public sector. At the same time, the
Big Boys and their followers, as well as opposition parties in Congress, opposed the
proposal because, they argued, it was not consensual: it was a similar version of the
first reform initiative, but the CACIF labor commission had not participated in the
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first reform initiative's negotiations in 2000. Thus, both the Big Boys and the
opposition parties complained that not all actors affected by the new reform
initiative had been involved in their enactment.
Notwithstanding these objections, Congress held two debates on the new initiative
on March 27 and 28, 2001, but did not ratify it. Given the FRG's control of
Congress and of the Executive, the Legislature's failure to ratify the initiative is
explained by internal divisions within the governing FRG party. As an interviewee
who served in the FRG government explained, the FRG party was divided into two
camps: the Rios Montt and Reyes Lopez camps. On the one hand, the Reyes Lopez
camp, led by Vice President Reyes Lopez, held most of its power in the Executive.
On the other hand, the Rios Montt camp, headed by President of Congress Rios
Montt, fully controlled Congress. As this interviewee argued, "In Congress, Rios
Montt held the final word and no FRG Congressmen moved unless he was ordered
to do so by the General [Rios Montt]." Thus, the interviewee continued, in late
March 2001 Congress did not ratify the second reform proposal because Minister
Alfaro and Vice President Reyes Lopez were unable to convince Rios Montt of the
importance of doing so. Rios Montt feared the reactions to the reforms of the Big
Boys and their followers in the CACIF.28
28 Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 16, 2007.
In light of his misgivings, President of Congress Efrain Rios Montt presented the
CACIF labor commission and the unions29 with a compromise in early April 2001:
instead of immediately approving the Executive's second reform package, he would
give them until April 20 to reach an alternative agreement (Spohn 2002). As Rios
Montt reminded both parties, the USTR would deliver his verdict concerning
Guatemala's trade preferences under the GSP/CBI in late April 2001. Moreover, as
he informed the CACIF labor commission and the labor unions, if they did not
submit an alternative, Congress would approve the Executive's second thirty seven-
point reform initiative.
At the bargaining table, the CACIF labor commission and the unions held
diametrically opposite positions. Unions based their negotiation position on the
forty-point first reform initiative that the Executive presented to Congress in May
2000. The CACIF labor commission focused solely on fulfilling the less
demanding ILO CEACR observation requirements (Spohn 2002). Surprisingly, the
two parties reached an agreement despite their divergent initial positions, and
delivered their final product on April 20, 2001. Their agreement was approved by
Congress on April 25, 2001 as Decree 13-2001.30 Because Congress defined it as a
matter of national urgency given the impending USTR decision Guatemala's GSP
and CBI trade preferences, the Legislature did not even debate the content of the
29 Represented by the two largest confederations, the Uni6n Guatemalteca del Trabajo (UGT) and the
Unidad de Acci6n Sindical y Popular (UASP).
30 Proposed as legal initiative 2441. Many of the reforms proposed in this initiative had also been included
in both of the previous Executive initiatives.
joint CACIF labor commission-union reform initiative, approving it immediately
(Expediente Decreto 13-2001).
As it appears from Table 2-1 below, the CACIF labor commission representing the
Big Boys and their followers gained the upper hand in the negotiations. The joint
eight-point reform proposal only addressed some of the CEACR observations and
did not extend beyond them, as unions had hoped. Most of its changes targeted
unions, seeking to facilitate their formation and organization by eliminating
requirements such as the Guatemalan nationality for union leaders and the two
thirds majority vote of firm workers to call a strike (see Table 2-1). It also reduced
government supervision of union activities as the State was no longer a guardian of
unions, but only had to ensure that conditions were adequate for union formation.
Additionally, the State's meddling in union's financial accounting was also
prohibited. However, one of the main sticking points in the labor union - CACIF
labor commission negotiations was agricultural workers' right to organize during
harvest season, which the final agreement did not legalize." CACIF labor
commission members, representing the Big Boys, were ecstatic with the results of
the negotiations,3 2 while the union leadership expressed its disappointment
"because [the reform did] not attempt to modify [the Labor Code] in a substantial
and profound way, as [the labor movement] expected" (Jose Pinz6n, LH 04/26/01).
However, unions chose to sign the agreement because they were skeptical that the
31 The right to strike of government workers was also at issue, but would never get resolved because the
FRG administration continually blocked it.
32 The agreement was truly "historic" as a CACIF representative pointed out, given that unions and the
CACIF labor commission were able to present a joint proposal.
FRG would obtain support for a more ambitious reform. Minister Alfaro echoed
the union leadership's disappointment, chastising Congress for failing to ratify
neither one of the two reform initiatives presented by the Executive (Diario La Hora
2001).
Table 2-1. Decree 13-2001: Articles changed to address ILO CEACR Observations
ILO CEACR Observation Labor Code
articles changed
1. the strict supervision of trade union activities by the Government (section 211, 221, 234
211 (a) and (b) of the Labour Code);
2. limiting the possibility of participating in the establishment of a provisional 220,223
trade union executive committee or to be elected a trade union official to
Guatemalan nationals (new paragraph, sections 220(d) and 223(b));
3. the requirement for the members of the provisional trade union executive 220
committee to make a sworn statement to the effect that, amongst other matters,
they have no criminal record and that they are active workers in the enterprise
or self-employed workers (new paragraph (d) of section 220);
4. the requirement of being active workers at the time of election and that at least 223
three are able to read and write (section 223(b));
5. the obligation to obtain a two-thirds majority of the workers of the enterprise 222, 241
or workplace (section 241(c)) and of the members of a trade union (section
222( ) and (m)), to be able to declare a strike;
6. the prohibition of a strike or suspension of work by agricultural workers during
the harvests, with several exceptions (sections 243(a) and 249);
7. the prohibition of a strike or suspension of work by workers of enterprises or
services, whose interruption would, in the Government's opinion, seriously
affect the national economy (sections 243(d) and 249);
8. the possibility of calling upon the national police to ensure continuity of work, 255
in the event of an unlawful strike (section 255);
9. the detention and trial of persons who try to publicly call an illegal strike or
suspension of work (section 257);
10. the imposition of a prison sentence ranging from one to five years for persons
who carry out acts intended not only to cause sabotage or destruction (which
do not come within the scope of the protection offered by the Convention),
but also to paralyse or disrupt the functioning of enterprises which contribute
to the economic development of the country with a view to jeopardizing
national production (section 390(2) of the Penal Code);
11. the imposition of compulsory arbitration without the possibility of having
recourse to strike action in public services which are not essential services in the
strict sense of the term, in particular public transport and services related to the
supply of fuel (section 4(d) and (e) as amended by Order 35-96 of 27 May
1996).
Decree 18-2001
Even after Congress approved Decree 13-2001, Minister Alfaro and Vice President Reyes
Lopez did not give up on the second, thirty seven-point reform initiative that the
Executive had submitted to Congress on March 15, 2001 and which had the primary
objective of enhancing the State's regulation of the labor market. Thus, they set out to
convince the Rios Montt camp in the Legislature of the importance of ratifying the
Executive's initiative. In this endeavor, Alfaro was especially well-placed given his long,
friendly relationship with Rios Montt, which dated back to the early 1980s.33 Moreover,
Minister Alfaro and Vice President Reyes Lopez found support for their effort in the U.S.
ambassador to Guatemala, Prudence Bushnell.
On May 3, 2001, shortly after Congress' approval of Decree 13-2001, Ambassador
Bushnell, with the blessing of the State Department, visited Rios Montt and the
Congressional leadership. Her demands were straightforward: the USTR would extend
the revision of Guatemalan trade preferences under the GSP/CBI trade programs, which
was supposed to end in April 2001, until late May 2001. By then, she explained, the
Guatemalan Congress was expected to have approved those reforms in the Executive's
second initiative which had not been included in Decree 13-2001. If not, the USTR
would likely revoke Guatemala's trade preferences (Spohn 2002).
The Ambassador's visit to Congress triggered a litany of complaints by the Big Boys and
their followers in the CACIF, who allegedly objected to the Ambassador's "imperialist"
interventions in the domestic affairs of the sovereign nation of Guatemala, but in reality
worried about the effects her visit might have on the Legislative decision regarding the
3 As Goldston (1989) explains, Alfaro had been Rios Montt's personal attorney. In 1983, while he was
Chief of State, Rios Montt countenanced the formation of the Confederacion Guatemalteca de Unidad
Sindical (CUSG), the oldest union confederation still in existence. Alfaro was asked by Rios Montt to
become its first leader.
Executive's reform package. For instance, in an interview Carlos Arias, head of the
CACIF labor commission, characterized Ambassador Bushnell as a "daughter of [an
unsavory woman]... who got it into her common-law-framed American head that we
needed to modify the Labor Code."34 The disdain was evident among the Big Boys and
their followers, and so was their concern that Congress would ratify the extended
Executive reform package and increase the State's presence in the labor market.
Simultaneously, Minister Alfaro and Vice President Reyes Lopez worked within the
confines of the FRG party to obtain support for the initiative. In this task, they could find
comfort in Rios Montt's past experience. As one interviewee eloquently explained,
"Ever since [most of the strongest groups in the private sector] failed to back him after
his 1982 coup, Rios Montt had held a deep-seated resentment against [them]."3 Alfaro
and Reyes Lopez could work on Rios Montt's pride, convincing him to "punish" these
private sector representatives, most of them connected to the Big Boys and their
followers, through the legal labor reform.
In addition, Alfaro and Reyes Lopez could also use Rios Montt's interest in creating an
electoral base for his party to obtain his support for the second Labor Code reform
initiative. Since the beginning of the FRG term, the FRG administration and Rios Montt
had expressed their interest in helping "the poor." As a labor unionist described, "The
3 Interview with Carlos Arias, July 31, 2006.
3 As Dosal (1995) claims, Rios Montt began on a good footing with the "oligarchs" in 1982, but soon lost
their support after he reprimanded them in a series of speeches for not paying their taxes and more
importantly, imposed the Value Added Tax. Valdez and Palencia (1998) corroborate this finding in their
discussion of the fiscal history of Guatemala. What was different at this point with the 1982 experience
was that economic elites would not organize a coup against the FRG government.
FRG had a populist rhetoric that attracted the support of many,"36 a trait which, as Piore
and Schrank (2006a) recognize, is to be found in many Latin American countries where,
in recent years, candidates have run on a platform of anti neo-liberalism.
Moreover, Rios Montt had a track record in this respect: although he directed a genocidal
campaign in the countryside during his period as Chief of State between 1982 and
1983,37 he also implemented some important labor reforms in the urban areas (Goldston
1989; Ambruster-Sandoval 2004; Homero Fuentes 1998). Most importantly, he accepted
the formation of the oldest labor confederation still in existence, the Confederacion
Guatemalteca de Unidad Sindical (CUSG). As Goldston (1989) indicates,
"So long as unions avoided confrontational tactics and contentious political
questions that might threaten the Army's institutional power, substantial
portions of the armed forces became persuaded in the early 1980s that
somewhat increased worker organization could serve as a symbol of tolerance
both at home and abroad... On May 1, 1983 this new policy of controlled
openness was concretized when, with the blessing of the government, a new
labor confederation, CUSG, formed and president Rios Montt's personal
attorney, Juan Francisco Alfaro Mijangos, 3 8 agreed to take charge of the new
group" (10).
Thus, as former Vice President Reyes Lopez argued, Rios Montt faced intense pressure.
In the former Vice President's words,
"It was really like there were two prongs pressuring General Rios Montt [to
approve the second Executive initiative in 2001]. One of them was the U.S.
Ambassador. The other was the Executive through Minister Alfaro and me.
The pressure was significant." 39
36 Interview with Anonymous Labor Unionist 8, July 18, 2006.
3 This thesis is in no way trying to defend Rios Montt's genocidal actions during his period as chief of
state, but is instead trying to underline that he also had a few positive policies, among them his labor
policy.
38 FRG Minister of Labor Alfaro.
39 Interview with Francisco Reyes Lopez, March 19, 2007.
Yet, despite the latent risk for Big Boys and their followers of these two prongs possibly
convincing Rios Montt to approve the Executive's reform initiative, the CACIF labor
commission was unable to reach an agreement with labor union representatives on an
alternative, less demanding proposal than that of the Executive's. Instead, the CACIF
labor commission attempted to present its own proposal on May 10, 2001 which only
added minor changes to Decree 13-2001, for instance proposing that new Labor Courts
be created instead of transferring the fining responsibility to the IGT (Expediente Decreto
18-2001).
However, in light of the absence of a secondjoint CACIF labor commission - union
movement reform initiative, Congress passed what had come to be termed the "Alfaro
Project" - the Executive's second, thirty seven-point reform initiative 4 0 - as Decree 18-
2001 on May 15, 2001. Instrumental in this decision was the support for the Decree of
FRG head and President of Congress Efrain Rios Montt, who was finally convinced by
the two prongs: Alfaro and Reyes Lopez in the Executive, and the U.S. Ambassador. As
directed by Rios Montt, the entire FRG congressional block voted in favor of approving
Decree 18-2001 (Spohn 2002).
A majority of Decree 18-2001's reforms focused on strengthening the State's labor
market regulatory apparatus, namely the Labor Inspection (IGT). The most important
reforms of Decree 18-2001 focused on articles 113, 269, 272, 292, 379 and 415 (see
Table 2-2). Reforms to articles 415, 292 and 269 transferred the responsibility to fine
40 Congress only approved 26 of these reforms through Decree 18-2001, as the eight reforms agreed to by
CACIF and union representatives, and approved by Congress as Decree 13-2001, were also included in the
Executive initiative; and Congress rejected reforms to another 3 articles.
noncompliant firms from the Labor Courts to the IGT. Specifically, the reform to article
415 withdrew this responsibility from the courts; the reform to article 292 endowed the
IGT with this responsibility; and the reform to article 269 delineated the fining process
for the IGT and ruled that all collected fines were to fall directly into the Ministry of
Labor's (MTPS) budget to modernize and equip its offices. Although, as Minister
Alfaro explained, the possibility of labor inspectors fining directly instead of going
through Labor Courts is contemplated in the ILO Conventions, most of the Latin
American countries utilize the Labor Court system. Thus, the reform was significantly
progressive in the region.
The reform to article 272, meanwhile, increased the amount of fines for noncompliant
firms, indexing these amounts to minimum wages in order to prevent them from losing
their real value with inflation.4 1 For instance, failure by owners to pay workers their
salaries or work compensation was now punishable with six to eighteen monthly
minimum wages, equivalent to Q. 6,660 - 19,980. Before, the maximum punishment for
this offense was Q. 5,000 and the minimum was Q. 500. As Spohn (2002) explains, fines
increased by a minimum of 200% and a maximum of 13,000%.
In addition, the reform to article 113 required the State to revise minimum wages
yearly.42 This was already required by an Executive Accord, but previous governments
41 As the Executive's draft initiative argued, it is necessary to "change in the form of establishing the fines
[from fixed quantities to indexed quantities], so that sanctions do not lose their value and become updated
as minimum wages are updated" (Expediente Decreto 18-2001). Goldston (1989) provides a dramatic
example of the depreciation of fines amounts when he describes how "the Code-specified amounts for
[employer resistance to labor inspections]... are from US$4 to 200, not nearly enough" (149).
42 Until then, this was an Executive Accord (Acuerdo Gubemativo), but the reform included it in the Labor
Code. As explained above, after the reform to this article the Executive had to set minimum wages yearly.
did not follow it because it was not included in the Labor Code. Finally, the reform to
article 243 legalized agricultural workers' right to strike during harvest season. This was
one of the CEACR observations which Decree 13-2001 had failed to address because the
Big Boys and their followers represented by the CACIF labor commission strongly
opposed it. However, after some time the Big Boys and their followers came to accept
this major advance in Guatemalan labor history for two reasons: first, the agrarian sector,
especially the coffee sector, was in a sharp decline as the economic foundation of the
country, and thus opposition of landowners behind the Big Boys was weaker; and second,
there were few unions in the rural areas, and thus strikes by agricultural workers were
almost nonexistent even if they were legalized.
Table 2-2. Decree 18-2001: Important reforms to the Labor Code
Labor Code Articles Resulting Changes
Reformed
269, 292,415 Transfer of fines from Labor Courts to Labor Inspection
272 Increase fines for noncompliant firms
243 Agricultural workers' right to strike in harvest season
113 Yearly revision of minimum wages
As observed by labor lawyers linked to government, labor unions and the international
community, the transfer of fining responsibilities from the Labor Courts to the IGT,
proposed by Alfaro and Reyes Lopez, was the most important piece of Decree 18-2001.43
This piece essentially expanded the reach and enhanced the capacity of the State's labor
market regulatory apparatus. Until then, State punishment for noncompliance with labor
regulations was highly ineffective. Labor Courts were severely backlogged and
Although it could not lower the minimum wage set the previous year, the Executive could maintain it at the
same level and not increase it, which the GANA administration following the FRG, did.
4 Interview with Alejandro Argueta, August 17, 2006; and interview with Ricardo Changala, July 13,
2006.
inefficient, since labor judges were few in number highly corrupt. For the Executive,
which proposed the reform, attempting to reform the Courts was extremely difficult
because it was beyond its purview of action, given the Courts' location in the Judicial
branch. Focusing on its own Ministry of Labor was simpler, and in addition, the fines
collected were directly added to the Labor Ministry's budget. Before, they had
accumulated in the coffers of the Labor Courts. In the presentation of the law, the
Executive argued that,
"With the reforms... we solve the grave problem of the inefficiency to solve
cases [by the Labor Courts] and by creating an administrative process [for the
IGT], we ensure that the fines will in fact dissuade noncompliance with the
law..." since "cases of noncompliance with labor law are [currently] sent to
the Labor Courts where they are processed with excessive inefficiency, taking
on average three years to be resolved" (Expediente Decreto 18-2001).
With the new legislation, labor inspectors could deliver fines directly to firm owners
instead of having to send their reports to labor judges who would then decide the
punishment. This change radically improved the efficiency of labor regulation
enforcement. At the same time, the legal reform to the Labor Code explicitly stated that
firms could only appeal fines through the "contentious-administrative" process if the
fines exceeded Q.5,000. For fines below Q.5,000, employers were forced to pay without
a recourse for appeal. As a strategy to avoid these contentions-administrative processes
which were financially costly for the Ministry of Labor since it had to pay for legal
defense, inspectors were instructed by the first and second FRG Labor Ministers, Alfaro
and Godoy, to fine firms at most Q.5,000, even though the new regulations allowed them
to fine higher amounts." However, this changed during the period of the third FRG
"Interview with Victor Moreira, August 9, 2006; interview with Victor Hugo Godoy, August 22, 2006;
interview with Alejandro Argueta, August 17, 2006; and interview with Guido Ricci, August 28, 2006.
Labor Minister, Moreira, as he instructed inspectors to fine according to the regulation
violation even if the fine exceeded Q.5,000. Moreira's decision shows the growing
regulatory strength of the Ministry of Labor, as it began increasing its fine collection and
could afford to engage in legal processes with firms.
Not surprisingly, this transfer of fining responsibilities met the staunchest resistance from
the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF. Although they accepted that a reform of
the old Labor Court fining mechanism was necessary, the Big Boys and their followers
complained that the mechanism created through Decree 18-2001 was unconstitutional
since, as one CACIF labor commission member argued, "according to legal jurisdiction,
the only ones who can fine are the courts and tribunals." 45 Many firms represented by
the Big Boys and CACIF chose not to pay the fines, and thus the collection rate was low,
reaching a maximum of 20% (see Table 2-3). Opposition to this specific reform was
such that CACIF labor commission representatives continued to complain in the mass
media and in interviews even after they accepted the rest of the reforms included in
46Decree 18-2001, among them agricultural workers' right to strike in harvest season.
Instead of the IGT fining procedure, CACIF labor commission favored the creation of
new labor courts.
Table 2-3. IGT Fine Collection Rates, 2001 - 2003
Percent collected of fines imposed
2001 5.92%
2002 13.23%
2003 20.17%
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social
45 Interview with Carlos Arias, July 31, 2006.
46 Interview with Carlos Arias, July 31, 2006.
Given the scarce results obtained from lobbying the Executive and Legislative branches
of government to block the reforms, the Big Boys and their followers represented by the
CACIF labor commission moved to the third branch of government, filing a series of
unconstitutionality appeals before the Constitutional Court (CC) 47 shortly after
Congressional ratification of Decree 18-2001 in May 2001. The CC is the highest court
in the country and its judges are appointed every five years. Interestingly, the appeals of
the CACIF labor commission focused mainly on the reform to article 269, which as
explained above, delineated the process that IGT inspectors had to follow in order to fine.
The appeals did not address articles 292 and 415, which removed the responsibility to
fine from courts and transferred it to the IGT (Valenzuela 2005).
Although the CACIF labor commission filed the appeals in 2001, an FRG-friendly CC48
maintained them in limbo until 2004, when it made its final decision to declare the reform
to article 269 unconstitutional. By then, the FRG government had finished its period and
the new, Big Boy and CACIF-friendly government of the GANA had taken control of the
Executive and Congress. The CC decision is examined in the last section of this chapter.
47 Schneider asserts that in the Latin American state there is a "...continued dominance of the executive
branch... However, as democracies consolidate and crises conditions fade, legislatures and judiciaries are
likely to loom larger as mediators in economic policy making and therefore as sites for more active
business participation." (Schneider forthcoming, 30). As seen above, this also applies to Guatemala.
48 A Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA) document describes how the President of the
Constitutional Court at the time was Judge Mario Guillermo Ruiz Wong, a childhood friend of Rios Montt.
As the WOLA document explains, "Ruiz Wong was named Interior Minister by President Portillo and
served from January to July 2000. He became the president of the Constitutional Court (Corte de
Constitucionalidad) on April 14, 2003" (Beltran and Peacock 2003, 87). The WOLA document also
emphasizes that "It is noteworthy that the Congress and the president play a major role in appointments to
both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court." ( Beltran and Peacock 2003, 43). Unlike the U.S.
Supreme Court, CC judges in Guatemala are not appointed for life, but rather change every five years.
Thus, the influence from the Executive and the Legislative branches on the Constitutional Court is
undeniable.
The Administrative Reform of the Labor Inspection (IGT)
To complement and reinforce the fining responsibility assigned to the Labor Inspection
(IGT) of the Ministry of Labor (MTPS) by the legal reform to the Labor Code, and more
generally to strengthen the State's labor market regulatory apparatus, Minister Alfaro
initiated an administrative reform of the Inspection to improve its capacity to enforce
labor regulation. Fortunately, the Minister's untimely death on February 6, 2002 did not
halt this administrative reform as his successors, Ministers Godoy and Moreira, continued
with it. The IGT administrative reform had five parts: first, a 40% increase in the IGT
budget; second, an increase in the number of inspectors from 160 to 292; third, a
publicity campaign designed to inform workers about their labor rights; fourth, the
creation of two specialized inspector units for underage, and garment and textile work;
and fifth, an internship program for San Carlos University (USAC) last-year law
students. 49 These reforms are described in detail below.
Unlike the legal reforms to the Labor Code, the administrative reforms of the IGT did not
require Legislative approval, making it politically easier to implement them. Most of the
reforms came in the form of Executive and Ministerial Accords,,5 0 which only needed
ratification by the President and his Ministers. Because Congress was not involved,
representatives of the Big Boys had less room to oppose and block these reforms. This
difference in the available avenues for Big Boy pressures was reflected in a much lower
level of contention in the process of administrative reform to the IGT relative to the legal
49 There were a number of other reforms, most importantly the creation of a Labor Defense Attorney's
Office within the confines of the IGT (until 2003, when it became independent). However, this thesis does
not include these reforms since they did not directly address the new demands created by Decrees 13-2001
and 18-2001.
50 In Spanish, these are called Acuerdos Gubernativos and Acuerdos Ministeriales.
reform of the IGT. The Big Boys realized that they could do little to obstruct reforms
taking place within an FRG Executive over which they had little control. However, as
explained above, the Big Boys and their followers did limit the effect of the reforms by
shirking payment of a large percentage of the fines imposed by labor inspectors.
The budget of the Labor Inspection
As Minister Alfaro understood, the first step of the IGT administrative reform was to
increase its budget significantly. In the previous government, the Executive and
Legislative branches were under the control of the Big Boy and CACIF-friendly PAN
party (1996 - 2000), which closely resembled the GANA administration (2004 - 2008)
that followed the FRG. During this time, the IGT's budget remained below Q. 8 million
in real terms (see Table 2-4).si
In the first year of the FRG government (2000), the budget remained fairly similar to the
budget of the last year of the PAN government (1999). This is explained by the national
budget determination and electoral processes' design in Guatemala: the first year FRG
budget was set by a PAN-controlled Executive and Legislature during the last months of
1999, before the FRG government took over in January 2000. However, for the second
year of the FRG government (2001) - the first year in which the FRG-controlled
Executive and Legislature determined the National Budget - the budget of the IGT
increased by almost 40%.
s'This is little more than $1 million. The base year is 1999.52 USAID program PROALCA also provided some extra funding for the IGT in 2001 (Frundt 2002, 30),
although most of the new funds for the Ministry came from the Guatemalan government's national budget.
The budget of the IGT did not fall substantially despite Minister Alfaro's death in 2002
and the selection of new individuals as Ministers of Labor, proving that the IGT
administrative reform was a project of the FRG-controlled Executive, not just of Minister
Alfaro. As Table 2-4 shows, the IGT's budget remained fairly constant in both real
Quetzales terms5 3 and as a percentage of the total national budget, throughout the next
three years. However, it is also clear from Table 2-4 that there was a slight decrease in
the IGT budget for 2003. As interviewees explained, this decrease responded to the
differences between Minister Godoy, who negotiated the 2003 budget, and Vice
President Reyes Lopez, who did not support Godoy as strongly as he had supported
Alfaro or as he would support Moreira.54 Godoy was loyal to President Portillo, and his
refusal to align with Vice President Reyes Lopez limited his Ministerial tenure to one
year (2002).
Table 2-4. Budget of the Labor Inspection
Year Governing Minister of IGT budget in real IGT budget as a
Party Labor terms (1999 base percentage of the
year) National Budget
1999 PAN Linares Q7,846,210.00 0.04%
2000 FRG Alfaro Q8,326,362.02 0.04%
2001 FRG Alfaro Q11,696,489.48 0.06%
2002 FRG Godoy Q1 1,960,244.59 0.06%
2003 FRG Moreira Q1 1,325,444.34 0.05%
2004 (Assigned) GANA Gallardo Q1 5,794,988.57 0.07%
2004 (Adjusted) GANA Gallardo Q7,803,221.63 0.04%
Source: Ministerio de Finanzas Pnblicas
As Table 2-4 also shows, in 2004 the IGT budget fell substantially. The original IGT
budget negotiated by the FRG Executive's Vice President Reyes Lopez and Minister of
5 The base year is 1999.
s4 Interview with Victor Hugo Godoy, August 22, 2006; interview with Victor Moreira, August 8, 2006.
Labor Moreira, however, was Q. 15,794,988.57 or 0.7% of the National Budget. Yet,
because Congress did not approve the National Budget in time (due to internal FRG
divisions) before the GANA took over, the GANA administration "adjusted" the budget
to a low of Q. 7,803,221.63.
The number of inspectors in the Labor Inspection
The second axis of reform involved the number of inspectors in the IGT. Until 2001, the
number of inspectors did not surpass 200. As PAN Labor Minister Luis Linares
explained,
"the emphasis [of the PAN administration] was the qualitative improvement
by providing inspectors with cars, training, etc. In addition, we increased
inspector wages through a bonus.ss We required new inspectors to have
completed half of their law studies, since by then they had already taken
courses on labor legislation."56
However, the number of inspectors remained the same during the PAN administration.
Between 2000 and 2002, FRG Minister Alfaro increased the number of inspectors
sharply, almost doubling their total number to 292, as Table 2-5 indicates. Table 2-6
shows that the effect of rising inspector numbers on the number of cases attended by the
Visits Section of the IGT5 7 was dramatic. Attended cases grew by almost 50% between
2000 and 2001.
5 Acuerdo Gubemativo 215-1999
56 Interview with Luis Linares, July 27, 2006.
" The IGT's Visits Section (Visitaduria) is charged with visiting firms to ascertain that they are complying
with labor regulations. Visits may originate in workers' complaints (de parte) or from inspectors'
initiatives (de oficio).
Table 2-5. Total Number of Inspectors, 2000 - 2003
Year Number of Inspectors % Increase
2000 16058 -
2001 27759 73%
2002 292 5%
2003 292 0%
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social
Table 2-6. Cases Attended by the Visits Section of the IGT, 1995 - 2001
Year Cases % Change
1995 6,564
1996 8,037 22%
1997 8,387 4%
1998 14,568 74%
1999 8,232 -43%
2000 14,172 72%
2001 20,788 47%
Source: Boletines Estadisticos 11, 12 and 13, Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social
Minister Alfaro also created a new monthly bonus to be added to inspector monthly
wages indefinitely - the Bonus for Professional Responsibility - which raised inspectors'
monthly wages by between 31% and 45%. The bonus was assigned based on the rank of
inspectors. For inspectors ranked under the Professional Assistant I - IV bracket, the
bonus was of Q. 1,000 per month. For inspectors under the rank of Technical Head II,
the bonus was of Q. 600 per month (Acuerdo Ministerial 128 - 2001). Table 2-7 presents
60
the final monthly wages for each inspector rank after adding the new bonuses.
Table 2-7. Monthly Inspector Wages
58 Calculated based on interviews, as Ministry of Labor Statistics were not forthcoming (Interview with
Victor Moreira, August 8, 2006; interview with Francisco Reyes Lopez, March 19, 2007; interview with
Anonymous Labor Inspector 1, August 2, 2006; interview with Luis Linares, July 27, 2006).
59 Calculated based on an interview with former Labor Minister Luis Linares, as Ministry of Labor statistics
were not forthcoming (Interview with Luis Linares, July 27, 2006).
60 As Anonymous Labor Inspector 1 explained, inspector wages have not changed since then (Interview
with Anonymous Labor Inspector 1, August 2, 2006). This is a decline of 57% in the purchasing power of
their wages between 2000 and 2007 (Banco de Guatemala 2007).
Position Base Wage Flat Bonus Professional Responsibility Total Wage
(standard Bonus (Acuerdo
for all) Ministerial 128-2001)
Professional Assistant I Q1,960.00 Q250.00 Q1,000.00 Q3,210.00
Professional Assistant II Q2,120.00 Q250.00 Q1,000.00 Q3,370.00
Professional Assistant III N/A Q250.00 Q1,000.00 N/A
Professional Assistant IV Q2,441.00 Q250.00 Q1,000.00 Q3,691.00
Technical Head II Q1,649.00 Q250.00 Q600.00 Q2,499.00
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social
The publicity campaign
A third initiative to improve the functioning of the Labor Inspection centered on
informing workers about their labor rights through a broad publicity campaign, with the
objective of motivating workers to present complaints of firm labor regulation non-
compliance. In 2000, Minister Alfaro began the campaign with two projects. First, the
Ministry distributed the "Cartilla Laboral," a bulletin that informed workers about their
rights. Second, the Ministry financed a Radio show entitled "El Catedratico Laboral,"
which taught workers about their rights and was transmitted by more than twenty stations
throughout the country (Portillo, 2001). In 2001, the same programs continued, but the
Ministry added a third project: the distribution to workers of 20,000 informative tables on
minimum wages to let them know the pay to which they were entitled (Portillo, 2002). In
2002, under Minister Alfaro's successor, Victor Hugo Godoy, a new program was added
to the publicity campaign which focused on informing women of their labor rights
(Portillo, 2003). In 2003, during the last year of the FRG government, and under the
third government Minister of Labor, Victor Moreira, the publicity initiative increased
substantially in coverage and project-number. Minister Moreira's administration
distributed forms and books to help workers calculate wages, financed television and
radio spots to inform women about their labor rights, and used megaphone-equipped
vehicles to inform rural dwellers about their labor rights and distribute flyers (Portillo,
2004).61 Unfortunately, no evaluation by the Ministry of Labor could offer results on
these efforts.
The Specialized Inspector Units
In October of 2003, during the tenure of Victor Moreira as FRG Minister of Labor, the
Ministry created two new special inspector units focused on underage, and garment and
textile workers. The first unit became responsible for "the attention and supervision of
the compliance with labor and social welfare laws in all those places and work centers
where it is known that boys, girls and teenagers work" (Acuerdo Ministerial Nn'mero 435
"B" - 2003). This meant that inspectors visited these workplaces to ensure proper
compliance with underage labor regulation. The second unit was charged with "the
attention and supervision of the compliance with labor and social welfare laws in the
enterprises that are dedicated to assembly in the garment and textile industry" (Acuerdo
Ministerial Nnimero 435 "C" - 2003). This unit visited garment and textile firms to
ensure that they were following labor regulation. Both of the areas of concentration of
these units - underage and garment and textile workers - usually receive an especially
high level of domestic and international scrutiny, which probably influenced the
Ministers' decision to create the two units. The Ministry assigned five inspectors to each
unit. In each, one of the inspectors became the Coordinator and Supervisor.
Little information exists on the achievements of the Underage Special Unit. However,
the Garment and Textile Special Unit has received more attention. Pipkin (2006)
61 Interview with Victor Moreira, August 9, 2006.
highlighted the role that one of the unit members, Cesar Gatica, had played in the
organization of the Cimatextiles and Choi Shin garment firm labor unions (Pipkin
622006).62 Similarly, data from the Ministry of Labor demonstrates that in 2003 and 2004
more than 35% of all firm visits by inspectors were to garment and textile firms
(Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social), a very high number since less than 3% of the
Guatemalan workforce is employed in this sector (ENEI 4; Vestex 2006). Additionally,
Schrank and Piore (2006a) explain that the Garments and Textile Unit has taken
"an active approach to labor standards and labor relations more broadly. To
facilitate collective-bargaining agreement, for instance, inspectors have
actually designed in-plant experiments on the effect of shortening the work
week and lengthening the work day on labor productivity and worker
satisfaction" (Piore and Schrank 2006a, http://bostonreview.net/BR31.5/
pioreschrank.html).
The student internship program
The last reform of the IGT came in the shape of an internship program for students
completing the last year of their law degree in the National University (USAC). On April
8, 2003, Minister Moreira signed an agreement with the Department of Legal Studies of
the USAC for students to support the Ministry of Labor by complementing the work of
different Ministry Departments. The IGT partially coordinated this internship program
(Acuerdo Ministerial 200-2003). Shortly after Minister Moreira signed this agreement,
62 The organization of these firms came before the creation of the Unit, but as Pipkin (2006) explains, "The
success of Gatica's empowerment and efforts, if not already clear to authorities earlier, was shown to be
recognized by the Ministry in late 2003 when the Inspector General added four more inspectors alongside
Gatica as specialists in the maquiladora sector" (57). Former United Nations observer Ricardo Changala
also observed that such a unit had existed, albeit without a name, since early in the Portillo administration
(Interview with Ricardo Changala, July 13, 2006)
the first class of 75 interns6 3 began their work. As a leading labor lawyer and professor
of the internship described,
"The internship lasted approximately six months. It began and concluded
with two 2 to 3 day classroom-based courses. The courses focused on the
structural organization of the Ministry of Labor; substantive, collective and
procedural labor law; and institutional administration. Presenters came from
the USAC and the Ministry of Labor... In the IGT, students ordered files,
attended hearings and accompanied inspectors in visits, and organized data
and statistics." 64
As this same interviewee explained, about 50 of the new interns worked in the IGT at one
time.65 In the classroom section of the internship, the students were divided into two
groups: those who received classes in the morning and those who received them in the
afternoon. During the job-based section of the internship, students were further divided
and rotated around different Ministry of Labor Departments, including the Visits,
Conciliation and Sanction Sections of the IGT. Table 2-8 shows a sample distribution of
students among the different IGT sections during the second round of internships.
Table 2-8. Distribution of Students in IGT Departments in Second Round of Internships,
January 2004
IGT Section Number of Students in Number of Students in Total
the Morning Group the Afternoon Group
Visits 14 4 18
Conciliation 12 0 12
Sanctions 11 6 17
Total 37 10 47
Source: Taller de Inducci6n y Capacitaci6n, Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social 2004
63 In an interview, Minister Moreira argued that 135 students participated in the first internship program,
but no data corroborates this claim (Interview with Victor Moreira, August 9, 2006).
* Interview with Alejandro Argueta, March 27, 2007.
65 This is a significant number considering that there are less than 300 inspectors country-wide (see Table
2-5).
Results of the legal and administrative labor reforms
The legal and administrative labor reforms had effects in two areas: 1) worker wages and
collective rights and; 2) the State's capacity to enforce labor regulation. The latter area
displays the most dramatic results. First, the increase in the number of fines imposed and
collection rates was substantial. Table 2-9 shows that between 2001 and 2003, the
amount of fines imposed increased more than seven-fold and the amount of fines
collected rose more than twenty five-fold. Although no verifiable statistics exist on the
collection rates of Labor Courts in the pre legal reform period (194766 - 2001), an
internal document from Minister of Labor, Godoy to President Portillo indicates that in
2002 alone, the IGT collected more than ten times the value of fines that the Labor
Courts had collected in total between 1947 and 2001 (Godoy 2002). Observations by
interviewees from various different sectors corroborated these figures.67 This dramatic
increase was not only due to improved collection capabilities of the State, but also to the
increased fine values as determined by Decree 18-2001.
Table 2-9. Fines imposed and collected by the IGT, 2001 - 2003.
Year Fines Fines Collected
_______Imposed _______
2001 Q911,911.15 Q53,956.50
2002 Q4,618,692.80 Q611,179.60
2003 Q7,442,102.56 Q1,501,253.55
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social
Second, the number of settled labor cases of firms found in non-compliance with labor
regulation skyrocketed, complementing the affirmation made in the internal document
66 The Labor Code was enacted by President Juan Jose Arevalo in 1947.
67 Interview with Guido Ricci, August 25, 2006; interview with Alejandro Argueta, March 27, 2006; and
interview with Victor Hugo Godoy, August 22, 2006.
from Minister Godoy to the President in 2002. In a letter sent to President of Congress
Rios Montt in May 2001, FRG Vice President Reyes Lopez expressed that in 2000 the
Labor Courts received 2,393 cases, but only settled 136 in total (Expediente Decreto 18-
2001). This number pales in comparison to the 923 cases 68 settled in fines by the IGT in
2002 (the year the document was sent from Minister Godoy to President Portillo). This
change represents an increase of 272% in cases solved per inspector, from 0.85 to 3.16
cases per inspector, even though the number of active inspectors also increased
significantly between 2000 and 2002.
Third, collected fines became an increasingly important fraction of the IGT budget,
representing almost 10% of it by 2003 (see Table 2-10). As explained above, following
the legal reform, all collected fines directly entered the budget of the Ministry of Labor
(MTPS) as opposed to the Labor Court coffers, and most of the fines collected were then
channeled to the IGT. The table below shows that as fines collected increased, their
contribution to the total IGT budget also grew.
Table 2-10. Fines Collected as a Percentage of IGT Budget, 2001 - 2003
Year IGT Budget Fines Collected % Fines of IGT Budget
2001 Q13,386,556.00 Q53,956.50 0.40%
2002 Q14,554,396.00 Q611,179.60 4.03%
2003 Q14,588,829.00 Q1,501,253.55 9.33%
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social
Turning to worker wages and rights, the effect on minimum wages - which according the
legal reform were to be set every year - was staggering in nominal and real terms (see
68 Although Ministry of Labor statistics do not detail the number of firms fined per year, a crude estimation
is possible. Taking the fact expressed by several interviewees that inspectors only fined firms Q.5000 or
less in order to avoid firm appeals,68 and dividing the total amount of Quetzales imposed in fines in 2002 by
this number (Q. 5,000), gives about 923 cases resolved infines.
Table 2-11). During the FRG period, minimum wages increased substantially as the FRG
became the only government in Guatemalan history to raise them every year of the
administration: on January 6, 2000; on November 29, 2000; on December 18, 2001; on
November 28, 2002 and on November 27, 2003 (Banco de Guatemala). No
administration had achieved this before the FRG administration, and no administration
has replicated it since. The FRG's increases also raised the purchasing power of
minimum wages to its highest point since at least 199169 (see Table 2-12). Additionally,
as Figure 2-1 shows, the FRG government pursued a strategy of agricultural and non-
agricultural wage convergence, as it narrowed the gap between the two wages.
It is also important to note that the minimum wage increases of the FRG came at a time
when GDP per capita was practically stagnant (see Figure 2-2). This contrasts sharply
with the trend before and after the FRG administration (2000 - 2004), when GDP per
capita was rising, but the real value of wages was stagnant or even decreasing.
69 It is harder to compare minimum wages before 1991, since during that time agricultural and non-
agricultural wages were subdivided into categories such as cotton picking, coffee picking, cattle herding,
bakery, textile industry, etc.
70 Interview with Francisco Reyes Lopez, March 19, 2007.
Table 2-11. Daily minimum wages in real terms (base year 1990) and nominal terms
Year Agricultural Daily Agricultural Daily Non Agricultural Daily Non Agricultural Daily
Wage (Nominal) Wage (Real) Wage (Nominal) Wage (Real)
1991 Q10.00 Q9.09 Q11.60 Q10.54
1992 Q10.00 Q7.96 Q11.60 Q9.23
1993 Q10.00 Q7.13 Q11.60 Q8.27
1994 Q14.50 Q9.26 Q16.00 Q10.22
1995 Q14.50 Q8.53 Q16.00 Q9.41
1996 Q15.95 Q8.46 Q17.60 Q9.34
1997 Q15.95 Q7.90 Q17.60 Q8.72
1998 Q17.86 Q8.23 Q19.71 Q9.08
1999 Q19.65 Q8.63 Q21.68 Q9.52
2000 Q21.62 Q9.03 Q23.85 Q9.97
2001 Q25.08 Q9.62 Q27.67 Q10.62
2002 Q27.50 Q9.92 Q30.00 Q10.83
2003 Q31.90 Q10.88 Q34.20 Q11.66
2004 Q38.60 Q12.05 Q39.67 Q12.38
2005 Q38.60 Q11.10 Q39.67 Q11.40
Source: Banco de Guatemala
Table 2-12. Purchasing Power of Minimum Wages (1991 = 100)
Year Agricultural Non Agricultural
1991 100 100
1992 88 88
1993 78 78
1994 102 97
1995 94 89
1996 91 89
1997 87 83
1998 91 86
1999 95 90
2000 99 95
2001 106 101
2002 109 103
2003 120 111
2004 133 117
2005 122 108
Source: Banco de Guatemala
Figure 2-1. Daily minimum wages in 1990 Quetzales, 1990 - 2006
GDP/Capita (1958 Quetzales)
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Year
Source: Banco de Guatemala
Figure 2-2. GDP per Capita in 1958 Quetzales, 1991 - 2006
Evolucl6n del salarlo ninimo real
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Source: Banco de Guatemala
Quantifying the effects of the legal and administrative labor reforms of the Portillo
government on workers' actual wages (as opposed to the minimum wage floor) and
collective rights is more complicated. At the time of the reforms, other important
changes were taking place in the country, most significant among them the coffee crisis
beginning in late 1999. These changes evidently affected workers' wages, obscuring the
results of the reforms (see Figure 2 above). Similarly, attempting to distill the net impact
of the legalization of agricultural workers' right to strike in harvest season, and the
reinforcement and streamlining of the laws governing labor unions, runs into the same
problems. In both cases, it was not only the Executive actions which affected worker
mobilization and organization, but also economic and political conditions.
With that caveat, the estimated effect of the reforms on worker collective rights does not
appear to be substantial. In terms of agricultural workers' right to strike, the effect
appears to be minimal. Yet, this effect is contingent on other important characteristics of
the agrarian economy. As Minister of Labor Moreira argued, "In terms of agricultural
workers' strikes in harvest season, the requirements appear almost impossible. For
starters, workers must have formed a union, but how many unions are there in the
fincas?"71 Ministry of Labor (MTPS) statistics are unclear on the number of agricultural
worker unions, as they also include cooperatives and informal worker unions. However,
as a labor unionist from the largest peasant union confederation in the country,
Confederacion de Trabajadores del Campo (CTC) explained, over the last few years the
number of CTC unions in two of the largest agricultural sectors, coffee and banana,
decreased substantially.7 2 In the case of banana, the decline became especially
pronounced after Hurricane Mitch hit Guatemala in 1998 and firms such as Chiquita and
the Del Monte subsidiary BANDEGUA abandoned many of their formerly organized
71 Interview with Victor Moreiera, August 9, 2006.
72 Interview with Anonymous Labor Unionist 3, July 20, 2007.
plantations on the Atlantic coast. This view was echoed by leaders of another important
banana-organizing confederation, UNSITRAGUA. 73
In the coffee sector, the coffee crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s severely
undermined coffee unions, as thousands of workers lost their jobs. Although Lucas did
not refer to unions in the third of the three largest traditional agrarian sectors in the
economy, sugar, Oglesby (2004) explains that today "There are no longer any
independent labor unions in the sugar sector, although a few mills have a sort of
solidarity association" (568). Moreover, many agricultural workers are not organized in
unions, but rather in peasant and Indigenous organizations such as the Coordinadora
Nacional Indigena y Campesina (CONIC), which mostly address land tenancy for
peasants rather than workers' rights. As two CONIC leaders explained, CONIC focuses
on providing members with access to land, technical support to cultivate this land, and
fmancial means to pay for the land. 74
In terms of worker wages in the sectors most intensively visited by IGT inspectors, there
seem to be some positive outcomes over the last years of the FRG administration, but the
results are open to debate and require further research. As shown in Tables 2-13 and 2-
14, inspectors focused on urban workers, especially in the commercial, manufacturing
(mostly garments) and service sectors. As Tables 2-15 and 2-16 show, for urban workers
in these sectors, the Guatemalan economic stagnation of the late 1990s and early 2000s
(see Figure 2-2 above) eroded their wages by up to 21.6% between 1998 and 2002.
7 Interview with Anonymous Labor Unionist 8, July 18, 2006; and interview with Anonymous Labor
Unionist 9, July 27, 2006.
74 Interview Anonymous Peasant Organizer 1 and Anonymous Peasant Organizer 2, July 26, 2006.
However, wages increased substantially in all sectors between 2002 and 2003, after the
legal and most of the administrative FRG labor reforms. In the case of garments, the
most intensively inspected industry, the wage increase between 2002 and 2003 even
made up for the value of wages lost between 1998 and 2002. Although in rural
agriculture - where fewer inspections occurred - wages also partially recovered between
2002 and 2003, their recovery was less pronounced than in all the other sectors.
Furthermore, as Table 19 shows, mean wages in the rural agricultural sector had not
reached the floor set by minimum wages in 2003, reflecting the low level of regulation
enforcement.
Table 2-13 Inspector Visits yEcoomic Sector 2003 an 2004
Table 2-14. Workforce
Sector 2003 2004
Agriculture 0.72% 0.71%
Commerce 21.21% 35.00%
Manufacturing (approx. 35% in garments) 45.08% 47.82%
Services 29.28% 15.68%
Other 3.72% 0.79%
TOTAL 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Ministerio de
Allocation by Area
Activity Urban Rural
Agriculture 9.93% 90.07%
Industry 51.65% 48.35%
Commerce 55.77% 44.23%
Services 67.34% 32.66%
Other 56.72% 43.28%
Trabajo y Previsi6n Social
Source: ENEI 4, 2003.
Table 2-15. Urban Mean Monthly Wages (1998 Quetzales) ,
Garments (35%
of inspections) Manufacturing Services
1998 Q1,204.12 Q1,641.71 Q1,949.35 Q1,709.22
2002 Q1,019.12 Q1,418.89 Q1,527.97 Q1,427.89
2003 Q1,221.89 Q1,550.73 Q1,608.84 Q1,535.31
Source: ENIGFAM 1998; ENEI I 2002; ENEI 4 2003.
Commerce
.
Table 2-16. Difference in Means 1998 - 2003
Garments [ Manufacturing I Services I Commerce I Agro Rural
Difference in
Means
Percent
change
Difference in
Means
Percent
change
Difference in
Means
Percent
change
Difference in
Means
Percent
change
Difference in
Means
Percent
change
1998 -2002 -Q185.00 -15.36% -Q222.82 -13.57% -Q421.38 -21.62% -Q281.33 -16.46% -Q119.64 -16.97%
t-statistic -40.26702507 -56.28033883 -56.69740251 -51.59674618 -107.5629449
1998 -2003 Q17.77 1.48% -Q90.98 -5.54% -Q340.51 -17.47% -Q173.91 -10.17% -Q95.85 -13.60%
t-statistic 5.374473838 -20.54796495 -47.57024993 -31.61149751 -90.70877521
2002 - 2003 Q202.77 19.90% Q131.83 9.29% Q80.88 5.29% Q107.42 7.52% Q23.79 4.06%
t-statistic 51.33189803 32.15298073 16.93201258 24.64268457 21.5902097
Table 2-17. Agricultural Minimum and Mean Wages 1998 - 2003
Year Mean Wage Rural Agriculture Minimum Wages Rural Agriculture
1998 Q704.98 Q428.64
2002 Q585.34 Q640.00
2003 Q609.13 Q698.64
Source: ENIGFAM 1998; ENEI I2002; ENEI 4 2003.
Thus, inspections seem to have affected wages in different sectors. As is made clear by
Figure 2-2 and Table 2-16 above, although GDP per capita remained stagnant until 2005,
wages in the three sectors in urban areas where inspections were most intensive
experienced a recovery between 2002 and 2003 (unfortunately, no similar surveys exist
for 2004 and 2005). It is true that IGT inspections only reached a small portion of all
workers in urban areas in these three sectors, yet it is arguable that they had an effect
extending beyond the confines of inspected firms, motivating non-inspected firms to
comply in order to avoid the risk of getting caught and fined. As argued above, however,
further research is suggested to obtain more accurate estimates of the effects of the FRG
labor reforms on worker wages.
The Aftermath of the FRG Administration
On January 14, 2004 Oscar Berger, from the Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA) party,
assumed the Presidency of Guatemala. In his acceptance speech, President Berger called
for "unity, security, justice, work, health and education for all" and for an end to the
confrontation between the Big Boys and their followers, and government representatives,
a hallmark of the previous FRG administration (Berger 2004). Most of the support for
President Berger and the GANA had come from the Big Boys and their followers in the
CACIF.
Given this support from most of the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF, it was no
surprise that the GANA administration partially overturned some pieces of the labor
reforms of the FRG government, most importantly the reformed Labor Code article (269)
delineating the fining process of the IGT. At the same time, it is noteworthy and
surprising that many other pieces of the FRG labor reforms were not overturned, despite
the Big Boys' belligerent opposition to them. As explained below, the decision of the
GANA to stop short from overturning all the FRG labor reforms was directly related to
the impending U.S. Congressional decision on the United States - Dominican Republic
Central American Free Trade Agreement (US - DR CAFTA or CAFTA) which partly
rested on the evidence of whether the State's regulatory enforcement capacity had
improved in Guatemala.
The legal reforms to the Labor Code
Between 2004 and 2007, the GANA kept most of the FRG legal reforms to the Labor
Code. The reformed articles involving the yearly setting of minimum wages, increased
fine amounts for non-compliant firms, harvest-time strikes for agrarian workers, and
mechanisms facilitating union formation and organization are still in effect in Guatemala.
In fact, these reforms were utilized by the GANA administration as proof of Guatemala's
improved State labor market regulation capacity. However, the GANA did target the
fining capacity of the IGT.
Shortly after the FRG-controlled Congress approved Decree 18-2001 in 2001, CACIF
labor commission representing the Big Boys and their followers filed a series of
unconstitutionality appeals. An FRG-friendly Constitutional Court (CC) did not resolve
these appeals for three years despite the intense Big Boy pressures, and thus Decree 18-
2001 was in force during the entire FRG administration. However, eight months after
President Berger assumed control of the Executive, the Constitutional Court (CC) upheld
the CACIF labor commission's unconstitutionality appeals and overturned a series of
Decree 18-2001 reforms. Of them, the most important upheld appeal overturned the
reform focused on the fining capacity of the IGT: the CC overturned the reform to article
269, which delineated the fining procedure for the IGT (Soto et.al. 2005).7 Because the
sentence of the CC did not overturn the reforms to articles 292 and 415 which transferred
the responsibility of fining from the Labor Courts to the IGT, it left a legal void: the IGT
was still responsible for fining but had been deprived of the necessary procedure to do so
(Maldonado 2005).
The pressures of the GANA Executive on the CC played an important role on the CC
decision to declare article 269 unconstitutional. It is important to note that although the
Judiciary and Executive branch are in theory completely independent from each other,
pressures from the Executive on the Judiciary are widespread in Guatemala. In a
document published in 2004, the Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA) explains
that,
"After a visit to Guatemala, Param Cumaraswamy, the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, concluded that
corruption, influence-peddling and their associated ills remained
widespread, fed by the political factors which continued to influence the
tenure, appointment and dismissal of judges. It is noteworthy that the
Congress and the president play a major role in appointments to both the
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court" (Peacock and Beltrin 2004,
43).
Similarly, in an interview, a United States Embassy labor attache to Guatemala explained
that, although the United States would never advocate for the Executive branch to
7 Of the articles reformed presented in Table 2-3 above, only article 269 was substantially changed by the
CC unconstitutionality ruling.
interfere with the workings of the Judiciary, he was "not naive" and knew that such
things happened in Guatemala all the time.76
Thus, as a series of interviewees argued, it seems evident that the GANA-controlled, Big
Boy-friendly Executive exerted pressure on the CC to uphold the CACIF
unconstitutionality appeals. What is less clear is why the CC, which was still FRG-
friendly, bowed before the Executive's pressures. Explanations by interviewees seem
purely speculative and vary enormously, with no hard evidence existing to back any of
them.7
Returning to the CC decision, the legal void it left after it removed the reform that
outlined the IGT's fining procedure could have been filled by an Executive Accord, as
recognized by the GANA Ministry of Labor (Documento interno Ministerio de Trabajo
2005). This Executive Accord could have provided a new procedure for the IGT's fining.
Instead, the Ministry of Labor of the GANA administration immediately stopped its
fining activities and never attempted to resume them. Some remaining fines were
collected, but all activities related to fines concluded in 2005 (see Figure 2-3). Despite
this setback, however, it is crucial to highlight that the option of enacting an Executive
Accord to outline the fining procedure of the IGT is still available, since in theory the
IGT is still responsible for fining.
76 Email interview with Anonymous U.S. Labor Attach6, July 20, 2006.
77 Some interviewees argued that the CC judges had found "new bosses" in the GANA and thus chose to
follow their directions. Others explained that the CC judges were still loyal to the FRG and thus wanted to
hurt the GANA by tarnishing its image with workers and, more importantly, endangering U.S. approval of
CAFTA. Still a third hypothesis argued that the CC had walked a middle ground, looking to leave the
business-friendly GANA content while at the same time making sure that the IGT could recover its fining
capacity through a Executive Accord.
Figure 2-3. Fines Imposed and Collected by the IGT, 2001 - 2005
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It is also important to mention that the CC's overturning of the reform to article 269 of
the Labor Code came in the midst of the United States Congressional decision on the
United States - Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade Agreement (US - DR
CAFTA, or CAFTA). In 2004, State labor regulation enforcement in Guatemala in terms
of wages, labor conditions, and unionization and bargaining rights among others, was of
central importance in Washington. At the time, U.S. labor groups, trade associations and
consumer groups were furiously lobbying to block the agreement, using Guatemala's
poor labor regulation enforcement record as an anti-CAFTA argument. Moreover, as
explained above, in 2001 the United States Ambassador to Guatemala Prudence Bushnell
supported the ratification of legal reform (Decree 18-2001) that included the reform to
article 269. Yet despite the importance of CAFTA for Guatemala and of the risks for its
ratification entailed in any kind of change to the 2001 legal reform, the CC, with pressure
78 Interview with Anonymous Labor Unionist 11, July 9, 2006.
from the Executive, upheld the CACIF's unconstitutionality appeal of the reform to
article 269, highlighting the limitations - albeit not complete futility given the other
upheld FRG labor reforms - of U.S. government pressures. The United States Congress
would eventually approve CAFTA by a narrow vote on July 27, 2005. Additionally,
Guatemala would commit to restoring the IGT's fining capacity in the White Book
(White Book 2005, 50), a document signed by the Central American and Dominican
governments in which they pledged to implement a series of recommendations in order to
meet the requirements of the Labor Chapter in CAFTA.79
The Administrative Reforms to the IGT
The administrative reforms would also suffer partial setbacks under the GANA
administration. Between 2003 and 2005, the budget of the IGT declined by about 16%
(Ministerio de Finanzas Pn'blicas) and the number of inspectors fell by 11.6%, from 292
in 2004 to 258 in 2006 (Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n Social)." Similarly, inspector
wages would remain unchanged between 2001 and 2007 despite the accumulated 57%
increase in inflation (Banco de Guatemala).
At the same time, the GANA kept most of the FRG administrative reforms. For instance,
an important number of the projects of the publicity campaign still exist, including the
79 Specifically, Guatemala's White Book commitment reads: "To emit a decree that legally restores the
authority to fine of the Ministry of Labor" (White Book 2005, 50). However, although CAFTA is now in
full effect, the Guatemalan Executive has yet to resume the IGT's fining activities, even though it can do
this at any time through an Executive Accord.
80 IGT officials explained that some of this reduction responded to the GANA administration's interest in
reducing corruption and "cleaning out" the IGT. However, IGT inspectors were also keen in recognizing
that many of the posts created during the FRG administration were converted into "plazas fantasma" (ghost
posts) during the GANA administration, as they were used by persons who were not working as inspectors
but were being paid as such (Interview with Anonymous Labor Inspector 1, August 2, 2006).
use of radio stations to inform workers of their rights. The special inspector units for
underage, and garment and textile work also continue to operate, as does the internship
program for last-year law students from the National University (USAC). Thus, despite
its Big Boy and CACIF ties, the GANA administration did not overturn all the FRG labor
reforms.
The reticence of the GANA administration to roll back all of the FRG reforms is mostly
explained by the ongoing discussion on the ratification of CAFTA by the U.S. Congress
at the time. Although the GANA administration calculated that it could partially overturn
the fining responsibilities of the IGT without having much of an effect on the U.S.
Congressional decision on CAFTA, it realized that it could not revoke most of the
administrative and legal reforms. In fact, many of these reforms were included by the
GANA administration Minister of Labor in Guatemala's advances in the White Book of
the Inter-American Development Bank. As a labor attache to the U.S. Embassy in
Guatemala summarized it, "2005 [U.S.] attention -- which was significant, to beat back
the business community's gutting of the labor inspectorate -- was due to CAFTA."81
81 Email interview with Anonymous U.S. Labor Attache, July 20, 2006.
Chapter 3
A Shielded Executive Opens a Political Window for Labor Reform
In November 1999, the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) government was elected
with 68% of the vote in a runoff against the incumbent Big Boy and CACIF-friendly
Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) party. With this victory the FRG captured the
Executive and a majority block in the Legislature. The Big Boys and their followers in
the CACIF, however, rejected the FRG during the campaign and after the election. Many
of the Big Boys and CACIF businessmen remembered how General Efrain Rios Montt,
leader of the FRG party and President of Congress during the FRG government (2000 -
2004), had excluded them from economic and social policymaking while he was Chief of
State between 1982 and 1983. Yet, there was a group, a "renegade" economic elite
differentiated from the Big Boys and their CACIF followers by status (i.e. the Big Boys
and CACIF looked down on the renegade elite), which did support the FRG election
campaign and government. In addition, the military also converged behind the FRG
party and its leader, Rios Montt. Support from these two groups allowed the FRG to win
the elections and to exclude the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF from
influencing and controlling the Executive. This Executive shielding from Big Boy and
CACIF pressures and influence differentiated the FRG administration from the
governments preceding (since at least 1986) and following it, as these other governments
were permeated by the Big Boys and their followers.
This exclusion of the Big Boys and the CACIF from the FRG Executive, however,
allowed the FRG to implement the legal and administrative labor reforms, with the
important support of the U.S. government represented by its Ambassador. Earlier reform
attempts by previous governments, which sought to increase State regulation of the labor
market, had been blocked by the Big Boys and their CACIF followers. In these
governments, the Big Boys and the CACIF utilized their many sources of influence (e.g.
positions in Ministries and government offices, meetings with top government officials,
etc.) to restrain reform attempts which would expand the presence of the State in the
labor market. For instance, they kept Ministry of Labor budgets extremely low, even by
Central American standards. Because the FRG excluded the Big Boys and their CACIF
followers from the Executive, these private sector groups could not use these channels to
block the FRG legal and administrative reforms.
The Rise of a Shielded Executive
The election campaign and government of the FRG was marked by a "rich versus poor"
rhetoric which alienated the Big Boys and the CACIF. Not only did the Big Boys and
their followers in CACIF reject the FRG rhetoric, but they also opposed the FRG party
leader, Rios Montt. Rios Montt, one of the worst human rights violators in Guatemalan
history, had excluded the Big Boys and the CACIF from economic and social
policymaking during his time as Chief of State because they opposed his government
plans. While in this position, Rios Montt raised taxes, created a Value Added Tax of
10% and opened a window for urban labor mobilization by allowing the formation of a
few unionss2 (Goldston 1989; Dosal 1995; Valdez and Palencia 1998; Fuentes 1998;
Beard 2001; Ambruster-Sandoval 2004). In addition, he carried out one of the most
brutal scorched land campaigns in Latin America "that killed an estimated 75,000, razed
a proclaimed 440 villages, and displaced over one million refugees" (Schirmer 1998, 1).
At the time, the Big Boys and the CACIF had strongly opposed Rios Montt's fiscal and
labor reforms, and this experience led them to oppose the FRG.
However, in the late 1990s, a "renegade" elite arose which parted file from the Big Boys
and their followers in the CACIF, and came to support the FRG. Most of the renegade
elite's support came through campaign contributions. As one interviewee explained, these
groups provided so much funding for the FRG campaign, that its total campaign
expenditures surpassed those of the Big Boy and CACIF-friendly PAN campaign.83 For
instance, a leading newspaper claimed that one of the main FRG supporters, a powerful
banker, provided Q. 40 million, or more than $5 million, in campaign funding (Prensa
Libre 2001). Today, the maximum campaign funding allowed by the Electoral Board
(Tribunal Supremo Electoral, TSE) is Q. 44.7 million. The renegade elite also staffed
Ministries and other Government offices during the FRG administration, and made
important mass communication outlets, such as television stations, available to FRG
politicians.
82 Rios Montt came to power in 1982 through a coup organized by the "reformist" factions of the military
(Beard 2001). These "reformist" factions followed policies which "entailed a shift from a national security
strategy that framed the conflict as total (100 percent) polarization of the population - you're either with us
or against us - to one that focused 70 percent of its effort on recovering war refugees through development
projects ('Beans') while using 30 percent of the effort for repressive methods ('Bullets') against those the
army viewed as 'lost"' (Schirmer 1998, 23).
83 Interview with Anonymous Academic 1, July 26, 2006
Led by the FRG Vice President Reyes Lopez, a truck company owner, the renegade elite
included a powerful banker; the second largest fertilizer importer in the country and the
owner of almost all Guatemalan television channels, among others (Palencia 2002).84 All
of these businessmen were "self-made men" (Cammett forthcoming) since they did not
belong to the traditionally powerful Guatemalan families (e.g. Castillo, Novella, Herrera,
Paiz and Gutierrez) and had made their fortunes starting from more modest backgrounds.
Additionally, most of the renegade elite were involved in more capital intensive
industries that agriculture (e.g. banking, telecommunications, fertilizer imports, etc.).
Furthermore, some of the renegade elite had ties to the military. For instance, Vice
President Reyes Lopez was a former member of the armed forces and spoke fondly of his
military training in Chile. Finally, as Palencia (2002) mentions, some of the renegade
elite were involved in illicit activities.
Yet, what most clearly distinguished the renegade elite from the Big Boys and their
followers was status: the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF looked down on the
renegade elite as a second-class elite because of the latter's non-oligarchic, military-
linked background and illicit dealings. The clearest example of this status divide
involves Vice President Reyes Lopez. A highly successful businessman in transportation
and other industries, Reyes Lopez could not participate in any chamber other than the
Commercial chamber of the CACIF because, as interviewees explained, "only [the
84
.Only one large conglomerate, owned by the Gutierrez Bosch family and rooted in poultry production and
distribution, joined the "renegade" elite in supporting the FRG, yet as interviewees quickly added, the
Gutierrez Bosch family provided financial support to all parties running in the election (Palencia 2002).
Chamber of] Commerce (which is recognized as a more democratic chamber) would take
the transportation businessmen as its members."85 Other chambers refused to accept him.
Therefore, the renegade elite looked to the FRG government as an opportunity for
enrichment which would circumvent the entrenched and much greater power of the
opposing Big Boys and their CACIF followers. From the FRG administration, they
hoped to obtain Ministry positions, government contracts and beneficial tariffs, among
other privileges, which Big Boy and CACIF-friendly governments had denied them. As
one interviewee explained, the Big Boys and their CACIF followers had used the State to
their advantage for many years, and now the renegade elite was simply following their
example. 86
The FRG government, in turn, wanted to create an alternative economic elite to the Big
Boys and their followers in the CACIF. Neither President of Congress Rios Montt nor
Vice President Reyes Lopez, leaders of the two camps in the FRG government, looked
well upon the Big Boys and the CACIF. 87 As an interviewee who participated in the
FRG government commented,
85 Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 28, 2007; and interview with Anonymous
Businessman, March 28, 2007.
86 Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 28, 2007.
87 As explained above, due to the support of the CACIF for the coup that deposed him in 1983, Rios Montt
did not look well upon the Big Boys and the CACIF. Regarding Vice President Reyes Lopez, the causes
for his opposition to the Big Boys and the CACIF are not as clear. Interviewees argued that he disliked the
Big Boys and the CACIF because, while he was on the board, other CACIF members did not treat him
well. He came from the transportation sector and most of the Big Boys and CACIF members looked down
on the businessmen operating in this sector. In addition, Vice President Reyes Lopez was not from one of
the Big Boys and thus disdained their monopoly over private sector channels of influence over government
(Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 28, 2007; and interview with Anonymous Businessman,
March 28, 2007).
"The leaders of the FRG used the power of the State to endow economic
power on their supporters... They told [the Big Boys], 'you should know
your place. There is an alternative political power [to yours].' They used
the State as a 'grabbing hand' to try to create an alternative capitalist class at
the shadow of the government."88
The relation between the renegade elite and the FRG administration can best be described
as a case of "vertical political integration" (Haber and Maurer et.al 2002). As Haber and
Maurer et.al (2002) explain, under vertical political integration, a government pledges not
to engage in "predatory behavior" against a specific economic elite faction, promising
instead to benefit this elite through the State. In return, the economic elite faction
credibly commits to supporting the government. Vertical political integration can be
"backward" when the government allows the economic elite to "write and enforce the
rules governing their own activity" or "forward" when politicians "directly engage in
productive and lucrative economic activity" (Haber and Maurer et.al 2002, 28). The FRG
administration appears to have integrated mostly backward: the FRG leaders provided the
renegade elite with political positions and power; benefited them with changes in tariffs
which enhanced their competitive ability (e.g. if they were importers, they lowered
import tariffs); and selected members them as contractors for public projects. 8
The military also chose to back the FRG.90 Not only did it support Rios Montt, a General
in the Armed Forces and a teacher to many of the military leaders, but it also opposed the
88 Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 16, 2007.
89 Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 16, 2007.
90 Like the "renegade" economic elite, the military supported the FRG through campaign funding.
However, the military also provided important political backing, as it was the only institution in the country
with enough political power (i.e. ability to influence politicians and the electorate) to act as a counterweight
to CACIF political power.
incumbent Big Boy and CACIF-friendly PAN party for at least two other reasons.91
First, the PAN government (1996 - 2000) negotiated the Peace Accords, which, as the
military leadership recognized, placed most of the blame and costs of the war on the
Armed Forces (Beard 2001). 92 The Big Boys and the CACIF emerged from the Accords
practically unscathed despite their shared responsibility for the atrocities committed
during the war. As explained by Beard (2001), the Big Boys and the CACIF broke their
alliance with the military when they refused to back the armed forces during the Peace
Accord negotiations of 1996. 93 Because of this Big Boy and CACIF - military break, the
military shared the FRG objective of weakening the Big Boys and their followers in the
CACIF, and creating an alternative economic elite, possibly linked to the military.94
The second reason why the military favored the FRG was the PAN government's policy
of weakening the Armed Forces. The PAN administration lowered the budget of the
Ministry of Defense and removed some of its leadership. 95  Moreover, the PAN
government placed a member of the Air Force as Minister of Defense, something to
91 As an interviewee explained, a third choice was the UNE party led by presidential candidate Alvaro
Colom. However, this party had strong links to the former guerrilla organized into the URNG, and thus the
military, still weary of the former guerrillas, chose not to back the UNE (Interview with Anonymous FRG
Minister, March 16, 2007).
92 Interview with Anonymous Academic 2, July 19, 2006.
93 In the words of Beard (200 1), "The manifest lack of interest of the Guatemalan elite in the military
accord (one of the Peace Accords) reveals a notable lack of support for the military... Getting rid of the
military not only removed a source of economic competition [since the military had enriched itself
throughout the years in power], but also gave both elites a way of getting rid of the past and presenting a
clean face to the international community... elites regularly blame the social injustices that led to war, as
well as the massive human rights violations during the wars, solely on the Armed Forces." The tensions
between the military and the CACIF began during the mid to late 1970s, and the final break came with the
1996 signing of the Peace Accords.
94 As described by a series of documents, the military had initiated a process of enrichment of its members
as far back as the 1970s. By the 1980s, the military elite had become a competing economic elite to the
CACIF (Beltran and Peacock 2003; Dosal 1995; Beard 2001). Especially during the period of General
Lucas Garcia (1978 - 1982), military leaders used the state to enrich themselves. As explained by Beard
(see footnote above), one of the reasons why the CACIF withdrew its support for the military during the
negotiation of the Peace Accords was precisely because it feared the military's economic power.
95 Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 16, 2007.
which military leaders objected furiously because "the Guatemalan army is by far the
most prominent and powerful of the three branches of the armed forces" (Schirmer 1998,
7).96 With the FRG, the military hoped to regain some of its lost political legitimacy, and
more importantly, increase the budget of the Ministry of Defense. This latter objective
contravened the Peace Accords, which stipulated that defense spending was to decrease
steadily after 1996. In addition, the military hoped to maintain its access to political
power through the Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP), a military structure supposedly in
charge of the President's security. 97 The military strongly opposed the Peace Accord
stipulations that this structure be dismantled (Beltrin and Peacock 2003).
The Shielded FRG Executive Pursues Labor Reform
Therefore, the FRG administration initiated its term with the support of both the military
and a renegade elite, and with the strong opposition of the Big Boys and their followers
in the CACIF. The support of the renegade elite and the military enabled the FRG's
exclusion of the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF from the Executive. Unlike
the governments which preceded (since at least 1986, e.g. PAN) and followed it (i.e. the
Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA) government), the FRG administration did not depend on
the Big Boys and the CACIF for campaign financing, did not place Big Boy and CACIF
representatives in government positions, and did not hold continuous meetings with the
96 Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 16, 2007.
97 Many of the EMP members were accused of serious human rights violations during and after the Civil
War (1960 - 1996)
heads of the Big Boys.9 8 This allowed the FRG administration to act more independently
of the Big Boys and CACIF. As Segovia (2004) explains,
"The rise to State power of the Frente Republicano [FRG] (control of the
Executive and principle force in the Legislature) between 2000 and 2003,
signified in practice a substantial loss of influence of the Guatemalan private
sector in the design and implementation of public policy, especially
economic policy, where historically, businessmen had enjoyed an significant
incidence" (Segovia 2004, 22).
The exclusion of the Big Boys and CACIF from the Executive, in addition to the FRG's
control of a majority block in the Legislature, proved crucial for the FRG labor and
administrative reforms. In past governments (e.g. PAN), as well as in the GANA
administration the succeeded the FRG, the Big Boys and their CACIF followers had
blocked labor reform efforts using their influence in government, i.e. meeting with top
government officials and convincing them to withdraw their support for reform; utilizing
their Ministry and government positions to limit the budget of the Ministry of Labor; and
lobbying and garnering support in the Legislature to turn down reform initiatives.
Because the FRG Executive was shielded from the Big Boy and CACIF influences and
pressures, such practices were much more limited during the FRG government. As
explained below, this enhanced the capacity of the U.S. government and the FRG
Ministers of Labor to influence and carry out labor reforms respectively.
The role of U.S. trade pressures
U.S. trade pressures played a central role in the FRG labor reforms. The exclusion of the
Big Boys and their CACIF followers from the FRG Executive allowed U.S. pressures to
98 Interview with Eduardo Weyman, July 28, 2006; and interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March
16, 2007.
traverse domestic government channels (e.g. the Minister of Labor, the Vice-President,
etc.) which, during previous governments (e.g. PAN) and during the succeeding Big Boy
and CACIF-friendly GANA administration, remained almost completely closed. In these
past governments and in the GANA administration, the Big Boys and their governments
selectively used nationalist rhetoric and refused to bow before U.S. demands, thus
limiting the effectiveness of U.S. trade pressures. By contrast, during the FRG
administration, when the Big Boys and their followers were excluded form the Executive,
these channels remained open to U.S. government trade pressures, enhancing their
effectiveness in influencing labor policy.
Much of the literature on the effects of international trade on developing country labor
conditions draws a direct connection between trade pressures and State regulation of the
labor market, arguing that trade pressures are a necessary and sufficient condition to
explain enhanced State labor market regulation enforcement. Specifically, authors such
as Ambruster-Sandoval (2004), Frundt (1998 and 2002), Goldston (1989), and Spohn
(2002) center on U.S. government trade pressures under two preferential trade programs
- the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)
- as the explanatory variable. Both of these programs are regulated by a mechanism
created under the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,99 according to which parties with interest
in labor could request that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) revise a
country's trade preferences if it failed to protect worker rights. The USTR could respond
99 The International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) and AFL-CIO participated in drafting the legislation. Ohio
congressman Donald Pease introduced the main areas of focus of the legislation (organizing, bargaining,
prohibitions on child labor, forced or slave labor, and humane conditions) in the renewed GSP (Frundt
1998).
to these petitions in one of three ways: first, he could reject the request; second, he could
accept the request but not cancel the country's trade benefits if it perceived that the
country was "taking steps" to solve the problem; and third, he could accept the request
and cancel the country's benefits after review.1 00 As these authors argue, only USTR
announcements of GSP and CBI trade preference revisions brought about labor reforms
to enhance the State's labor market regulation enforcement in Guatemala.
Interviewees in Guatemala also presented the trade pressure - improved State labor
market regulation enforcement argument when referring to the FRG labor reforms: they
claimed that the reforms responded solely to United States trade pressures. For instance,
when referring to the legal reforms to the Labor Code, the United States Embassy labor
attach6 in Guatemala argued that
"International pressure (i.e., US pressure) has been the ONLY thing to
enhance labor law enforcement. The 2001 reforms were in direct response
to US government pressure... which was significant....No domestic
pressures did anything and no other governments, international
organizations, or labor organizations did anything" 101
However, although the U.S. trade pressures explanation for the labor reforms seems
convincing, it suffers from important limitations. First, Guatemalan history contains a
series of cases of earlier crucial labor reforms coming at times of total U.S. government
indifference with Guatemalan labor conditions and even aversion to the Guatemalan
10 The USTR could revoke trade benefits for reasons other than labor. In 1993, for example, the USTR
immediately cancelled Guatemala's trade benefits under the two programs after President Serrano
dissolved Congress in what was termed a "self-coup" (auto golpe). Eventually, Serrano would step down,
largely due to the Big Boys and CACIF fear of losing their access to the U.S. market (Dosal 1997; Valdez
and Palencia 1998). This is the only instance when the USTR cancelled Guatemala's trade benefits, and it
happened immediately after Serrano's self-coup, without any extended period of revision.
101 Email interview with Anonymous U.S. Labor Attache, July 20, 2006.
government implementing the reforms. Two such cases of labor reforms came during the
presidencies of Juan Jos6 Ardvalo and Jacobo Arbenz (1944 - 1954) and General Kjell
Laugerud (1974 - 1978).
In 1947, the administration of newly elected President Juan Jos6 Ardvalo enacted the first
Labor Code of the country, which
"... established collective bargaining rights, minimum wages, compensation
for industrial accidents and regulation of work hours. It also outlined the
right to an eight-hour day, to unionize, to bargain collectively, and to strike"
(Yashar 1997, 128)
Yashar (1997) explains that in addition to enacting the new Labor Code the Ardvalo
government, and the succeeding Arbenz government, enforced the new regulations,
leading to skyrocketing unionization rates and worker empowerment (Witzel de Ciudad
1995). Despite these advances, the U.S. did not look well upon these governments,
especially after the Arbenz administration initiated an Agrarian Reform that was seen by
American officials as Communist-influenced (Yashar 1997; Dosal 1997; Gleijeses 1991).
The apprehension of a "Communist" intervention so close to U.S. soil would eventually
lead the U.S. government to back the coup that overthrew the Arbenz government in
1954. However, what is important to underscore for the purposes of this thesis is that the
labor reforms of the Ardvalo and Arbenz governments, although eminent in Guatemalan
history, received no support from the U.S. government.
A later period of labor reform without U.S. pressure came during the military government
of Kjell Laugerud (1974 - 1978). At this time, the military elite created a political
window for improved labor conditions as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy
emphasizing wealth redistribution. As the "modernizing" factions of the military in
control of the government reasoned, improved labor conditions and enhanced labor
regulation enforcement would redistribute wealth and sap support for the guerrilla (Dosal
1997; Levenson-Estrada 1994). During this time, important unionization drives by urban
workers led to the creation of the Comite Nacional de Unidad Sindical (CNUS), the first
autonomous union confederation since 1954, and the foundation of the Coca Cola union
(Frundt 1987; Levenson-Estrada 1994). Although CNUS would practically disappear in
the bloody repression of the late 1970s, over the next decade the Coca Cola union became
an international symbol of Guatemalan unionism: the union successfully overcame the
anti-union practices of the Coca Cola plant management in Guatemala to consolidate its
position within the firm. In this process, the Coca Cola union in Guatemala received
much support from labor and religious organizations from around the world (Frundt
1987, Levenson-Estrada 1994).
Yet, during the earlier Ardvalo, Arbenz and Laugerud presidencies, 0 2 U.S. concern over
labor conditions in Guatemala was much more muted than it was after the 1984 Trade
and Tariff Act. A second limitation of the U.S. pressure explanation for the labor reforms
involves the period following the 1984 Act. As explained above, the Act created new,
102 As mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, while he was Chief of State (1982-2983) Rios Montt also accepted a
series of labor reforms, most importantly the creation of the oldest labor union federation still in existence,
the CUSG. As in the case of Ardvalo and Arbenz, and Laugerud, Rios Montt's reforms came at a time
when the U.S. had a limited influence on the Guatemalan Executive: the Carter administration had placed
an arms embargo on the country in 1976 - meaning the Guatemalan military was not dependent on the U.S.
in its war against the guerrilla (which had been one of the main points of influence of the U.S. government
over the Guatemalan government) - and exports to the U.S. under any kind of trade preference program
were negligible (Frundt 1998) This latter point directly counteracts the assertion included in some studies
on Guatemala (Goldston 1989; Ambruster-Sandoval 2004) that Rios Montt accepted the creation of the
CUSG because the U.S. demanded it as a prerequisite to include Guatemala in the Caribbean Basin
Recovery Act of 1983. This is not to say that the U.S. pressures did not play an important role in the
creation of the CUSG, but rather that it was other, domestic conditions (to which I return later), which
played the leading role.
more direct mechanisms of U.S. government policing of Guatemalan labor conditions.
U.S. and Guatemalan labor-related parties used the new mechanisms extensively to
address labor conditions in the country: between 1986 and 2001, Guatemala became the
Latin American country with the most revisions by the USTR (Frundt 1998). As Table
3.1 shows, the USTR reviewed Guatemalan trade preferences seven times between 1986
and 2001.
Table 3.1. USTR revisions of Guatemalan trade preferences under the GSP/CBI Trade
Programs
Year Filing Labor Group USTR action
1986 AFL Accepted for revision
1987 AFL Rejected for revision
1988 ILRF Rejected for revision
1989 UE Rejected for revision
1990 UE Rejected for revision
1991 ILRF and AFL Rejected for revision
1992 ILRF and AFL Accepted for revision
1993 ILRF and AFL Pended (cont'd review)
1994 Pended (cont'd review)
1995 ILRF and AFL Pended (cont'd review)
1996 Pended (cont'd review)
1997 Removed from review
1998 US/Leap, UNITE, ILRF, AFL-CIO Rejected for revision
1999 US/Leap, UNITE, ILRF, AFL-CIO Rejected for revision
2000 AFL Accepted for revision
2001 1 Removed from revision
Sources: Tsogas 2000; Frundt 1998; US/Leap Fact Sheet 2001
Moreover, pressures by the USTR became especially significant after 1993. Frundt
explains that "USTR reviews up to 1993 were molded more by politics as well as
embassy personnel inexperience.... But after 1993, the fall of the USSR and the end of
the Cold War, made the USTR more 'sensitive."' (ibid, 69)
However, despite these new channels of pressure, no pre-2001 reform ascribed to these
pressures effectively improved national level State enforcement of labor regulations in
Guatemala.10 3 In other words, the Guatemala government did not implement nor enforce
these reforms. This failure of US pressures is closely related to the Big Boys and CACIF
belief that the US would never remove Guatemala's trade preferences. As a leading
CACIF labor representative argued,
"CACIF negotiated as a result of GSP/CBI pressures for ten years, until one
day we said 'enough, we won't listen to this anymore.' We knew that the
United States would never remove our preferential trade access."1 0 4
Because, as explained before, the Executives before the FRG administration were
permeated by Big Boy and CACIF pressures and influences (e.g. positions in
Ministries and government offices, direct relations with top government officials),
the position of the Big Boys and CACIF regarding the credible commitment of the
U.S. government to remove Guatemala's trade preferences translated into the
Guatemalan government's policy regarding U.S. trade pressures. In other words,
the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF successfully blocked almost all
attempts to address U.S. trade pressures by the governments before the FRG,
closing off most of the channels of influence that the U.S. could traverse to
influence labor policy.
103 However, a finding of this thesis, which requires further research, is that U.S. pressure, and more
generally international pressure, is much more effective when targeted at specific firms, especially when
the objective is to encourage or strengthen unionization. When international pressures come, it is much
easier for the Guatemalan government to force a single firm to comply, than to require an entire industry or
sector to uphold labor regulation. The opposition of a single firm is much easier to handle for the central
government than the opposition of an entire sector. Previous research supporting this finding focuses on
the unions at the Coca-Cola plant (Frundt 1987; Levenson-Estrada 1994), the Phillips Van Heusen (PVH)
plant (Ambruster-Sandoval 2005), the INEXPORT plant (Frundt 1998), two ANACAFE coffee fincas
(Frundt 1998), SITRABI (Frundt 1999; Interview with Anonymous Labor Unionist 10, June 1, 2006) and
Choi Shin and Cimatextiles (Pipkin, 2006). No equivalent cases of success exist at the level of national
labor policy (like the FRG legal and administrative reforms).
14 Interview with Carlos Arias, July 31 2006.
Perhaps the most important (and one of the few) labor reform attempt resulting from U.S.
pressures during the period included in Table 3.1 was the 1992 legal reform to the Labor
Code. On that year, the USTR placed Guatemala's trade preferences under review. The
1992 legal reform to the Labor Code changed thirty two articles and "simplified union
registrations, increased fines, and strengthened court procedures" (Frundt 1998, 150).105
However, in spite of USTR pressures the Guatemalan State never fully implemented the
reforms. Frundt (1998) explains that "Although it had revised its labor code, Guatemala
had not implemented a single enforcement order in two years" (155). Instead, when
pressured to implement and enforce the reform, "the Guatemalan government grew
defensive. It employed three U.S. based law firms to file briefs on its behalf with USTR,
none of which addressed labor-code compliance" (Frundt 1998, 150). The government's
defensiveness underscores how the channels of influence for U.S. pressure during the
FRG administration (e.g. the Minister of Labor, the Vice-President) were closed in 1992,
thus limiting their effectiveness.
More generally, interviewees from the U.S. and Guatemalan union sectors, referred to all
the GSP/CBI engendered labor reforms enacted between 1984 and 2001 as "cosmetic":
like makeup on a face, the apparently substantial reforms covered a much less attractive
reality of labor rights protection in the country, as the State failed to enforce the new
reforms. Although these pre-2001 labor reforms would be better described as "partial" or
"stunted," the central idea remains the same: the reforms solely driven by GSP/CBI
105 In fact, this legal reform addressed many of the same CEACR observations that are the subject of the
2001 legal reform to the Labor Code described in the previous chapter. Recall that these observations were
made starting in 1989.
pressures from the U.S. failed to attain their expected results when it came to State
implementation and enforcement. 106 In other words, State implementation and
enforcement of labor regulation did not improve as a result of U.S. trade pressures. For a
leading U.S. labor advocate, for example,
"There has been a constant level of inadequate enforcement [by the
Guatemalan State] with moments of time when it was better and others
when it was considerably worse. But overall, it was consistently inadequate.
Most of the time, when it improved was when it seemed like trade benefits
would be threatened. Then there would be a whole flurry of effort... as in
moments when there was a GSP petition.. .but then everything would return
to the same level of inadequate enforcement."10 7
However, the question then becomes how one knows that the two FRG labor reforms
were not "cosmetic," "partial" or "stunted."10 8 Three facts answer this question. First,
the value of fines imposed and collected by the IGT, as well as the number of cases
attended soared after the FRG labor reforms, increasing seven, twenty five and seven-fold
10 The inability of the US government to produce any important changes through its pressures can partly
be explained by what Hirschman terms "disparity of attention." "A country whose trade or investment is
dominated by ties to a large and rich country is, at some point, likely to devote its attention with single-
minded concentration to this uncomfortable situation and to an attempt to loosen or cut these ties. But the
large rich country which carries only a small portion of its international economic relations with the
country it dominates is normally preoccupied with its more vital other interests, for example, with its
relations to the larger powers. Hence our basic economic disparity generates a disparity of attention... and
this disparity now favors the dependent country: that country is likely to pursue its escape from domination
more actively and energetically than the dominant country will work in preventing this escape" (47). I
would like to thank Andrew Schrank for pointing this out to me.
In addition, the Guatemalan state was especially independent, relative to the other Central American
countries, of U.S. military support during the Civil War. It was the only Central American state that
resolved its Civil War without much U.S. support, since in 1978 Carter had placed on embargo on U.S.
military aid to Guatemala. This difference increased the relative independence of Guatemala from the U.S.
government (Beard 2001, Segovia 2006, interview with Anonymous Academic 4).
107 Interview with Anonymous Labor Unionist 10, June 1, 2006.
108 As Frundt (2002) and Spohn (2002) correctly argue, the USTR revision process of Guatemalan trade
preferences beginning in 2000 was exceptional, "In an unprecedented step in October 2000, the USTR
bypassed its own petition process to target Central American compliance directly. The USTR placed
Guatemala on probation..." (Frundt 2002, 41). This unprecedented step accelerated the Guatemalan
Congress' ratification of the legal reforms, underscoring the importance of U.S. pressures. However, it is
also important to note that the first reform initiative of the FRG Executive was presented to Congress
almost six months before the USTR announced its decision. The crucial role for U.S. pressure came in
convincing part of the FRG cabinet and the Legislature, especially President of Congress Rios Montt, to
ratify the legal reform to the Labor Code, and in ensuring that the GANA administration did not completely
overturn the legal and administrative reforms.
respectively. Second, minimum wages increased yearly. Third, the decision of the Big
Boy and CACIF-friendly GANA government to retreat on certain reforms, most
importantly the IGT's fining capacity, further attest to the effectiveness of the FRG labor
reforms. Had the labor reforms been purely cosmetic, partial or stunted, this business-
friendly government would not have decided to roll them back.
The decision of the GANA administration to curtail certain reforms in 2004 also adds
further evidence to the limits of U.S. pressures over Guatemala. In other words, it shows
that government channels of influence traversed by U.S. pressures - which had been open
during the FRG administration - were almost completely sealed by the new GANA
government. The GANA Executive pressured the CC into upholding the
unconstitutionality appeals presented by the CACIF representatives, and the GANA
Ministry of Labor reduced the number of inspectors and the budget of the IGT during
2004. These actions came in the midst of the U.S. Congress' debate on the ratification of
the United States - Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade Agreement (US
DR-CAFTA or CAFTA). At the time, U.S.-based labor groups were feverishly lobbying
to block the agreement, and many U.S. Congressmen were undecided.10 9 However, in
spite of these CAFTA-related pressures, the GANA administration rolled back some of
the FRG reforms.
And yet, at the same time, U.S. pressures are not futile. Continuing with the
aforementioned case, the GANA administration did not overturn most of the FRG
reforms - only some of them - because of CAFTA and the associated U.S. pressures. In
10 Interview with Anonymous Labor Unionist 11, July 9, 2006.
Washington, concern over labor rights in CAFTA's ratification was so significant that the
Central American and Dominican governments were required to sign the White Book as
a requisite for CAFTA's ratification. This White Book included a series of
recommendations that signatory governments were expected to implement in order to
meet the requirements of the Labor Chapter in CAFTA. In addition, the GANA
administration included some of the FRG labor reforms in the White Book as
Guatemala's advances in labor issues. As the U.S. Embassy labor attach6 recognized,
CAFTA played an important role in preventing the "emasculation" of the IGT by the
CACIF." 0 It is important to underscore, however, that this was a unique situation where
the negotiation of a trade agreement enhanced the influence and effectiveness of the U.S.
government in Guatemalan labor policy."'
More generally, this thesis argues that for U.S. pressures to be effective, they must
traverse domestic government channels (e.g. the Minister of Labor, the Vice-President)
whose openness varies from administration to administration. During the FRG
administration these channels were more open because the Big Boys and CACIF were
excluded from the Executive and thus the effectiveness of U.S. pressures was enhanced.
These channels were almost completely closed during the Big Boy and CACIF-friendly
GANA administration, reducing albeit not completely nullifying the effectiveness of the
U.S. government pressures.
110 Email interview with Anonymous U.S. Labor Attache, July 20, 2006.
I11 Interestingly, although one of the few Guatemalan government's commitments in the White Book was
to return the fining responsibility to the IGT, the Guatemalan government has yet to meet this obligation.
Therefore, based on the available evidence, U.S. trade pressure was a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the FRG labor reforms. On the one hand, U.S. pressures did play
an important role in the labor reforms of the FRG: as explained in the previous chapter,
they were instrumental in the Ministers of Labor and Vice-President's lobbying to obtain
the Guatemalan Congress' approval of the legal reforms to the Labor Code, and in
limiting the GANA administration's retreat from them. On the other hand, history and
the process of reform described in the previous chapter show that U.S. government trade
pressures alone cannot explain why the labor reforms of the FRG administration were
implemented. U.S. pressures did not initiate the discussion on whether a Labor Code
reform was necessary, nor did they ensure that the Executive would implement and
enforce the legal reform through an administrative reform. To explain the Executive
decisions, one must look elsewhere.
The role of a labor-embedded, Weberian bureaucracy
The Ministers of Labor of the FRG government also played a crucial role in the labor
reforms. As interviewees correctly pointed out, two of the three FRG Ministers of Labor,
Ministers Alfaro and Moreira, came from the labor union sector, the former being the
first labor unionist in Guatemalan history to become Minister of Labor.11 2 The third
Minister of Labor of the FRG administration, Minister Godoy, although not from the
labor union sector, had an extensive background in human rights activism. 1 3 Moreover,
112 Interview with Francisco Reyes Lopez, March 19, 2007.
113 Before becoming Minister of Labor, he had been the Secretary of State for Human Rights in Guatemala
for the FRG government, and before that he had served in Congress and was part of the Congressional
Labor Commission (1986-1990), which he presided from 1989 to 1990 (Interview with Victor Hugo
Godoy, August 22, 2006). At the time of the interview for this thesis, he was also involved in human rights
activism.
the three Ministers held close relations with key members of the FRG party and
administration, and all of them had a vast experience working on labor issues. Minister
Alfaro had been Rios Montt's personal lawyer since the early 1980s, and had also worked
closely with FRG Vice President Francisco Reyes Lopez while they were both members
of the Congressional Labor Commission in the early 1990s. 1 4 Minister Moreira enjoyed
ample support from both President Portillo and Vice President Reyes Lopez in the
Executive, and President of Congress Rios Montt, and had led the National Electric
Institute's (INDE) union for many years. Finally, Minister Godoy was closely linked to
President Portillo, who had first placed him in the State Office for Human Rights and
then moved him to the Ministry of Labor after Minister Alfaro's death. Godoy had also
worked on and presided over the Congressional Labor Commission in the early 1990s.
However, unlike Ministers Moreira and Alfaro, Godoy did not enjoy the full support of
Vice-President Reyes Lopez. Because Reyes Lopez controlled the Executive, Minister
Godoy could not fully advance his planned reforms nor increase the Ministry's budget,
although he did continue with the Ministry line traced by Alfaro. Thus, the three
Ministers' "embeddedness" (Evans 1989) in the labor and broader human rights
movement provided them with a motivation to implement the labor reforms of the FRG
administration. Their political connections within the FRG administration, and
experience on labor issues - their "Weberianness" (Evans and Rauch 1999) - especially
in the cases of Ministers Alfaro and Moreira, presented them with the means to
implement them.
114 They both worked on the 1992 legal reforms to the Labor Code explained above. In an interview,
former Vice President Reyes Lopez described how Minister Alfaro also served as an adviser to a union in
one of Mr. Reyes' firms. Former Vice-President Reyes Lopez proudly claimed that it was him, and not
Rios Montt, who had brought Alfaro, "the first labor unionist to become Minister of Labor," to the FRG
government (Interview Francisco Reyes Lopez, March 19, 2007)
There is substantial literature on the importance of Weberian, embedded bureaucracies in
reform processes. Evans (1989) underscores the importance of bureaucrats being linked
to external networks, or being "embedded" in these networks. Although Evans is
referring to networks connecting the "State and corporate elites" as part of a
"developmental state," the argument for embeddedness can be extended to Labor
Ministers connected to the broader labor movement networks: their connection to these
networks endows them with the necessary information and consensus-formation-capacity
to enact and implement effective labor reforms. In terms of Weberianness, Evans (1989)
and Evans and Rauch (1999) underscore the importance of long-term career paths and
exceptional experience and knowledge. This literature appears to find support in the
cases of the three FRG Ministers of Labor. The three Ministers were embedded in the
labor and broader human rights movement. Additionally, they all had exceptional
experience and knowledge on labor issues: the three Ministers boasted long careers with
labor unions and in Congress, and had extensive leadership experience.
Nonetheless, this labor-embedded, Weberian bureaucracy explanation falls short from
fully accounting for the FRG reforms for two reasons. First, many of the predecessors of
the three FRG Ministers of Labor (see Table 3.2) were also embedded in the labor and
broader human rights movement but could not implement significant reforms like the
FRG Ministers. As FRG Minister of Labor Godoy recognized,
"Since at least the time of Lucas Garcia (1978 - 1982), there has been a
preoccupation with having someone with social sensibility in the Ministry.
The Ministry is seen as the soft side of the Executive. There we find
Sol6rzano, Ortiz Moscoso, Soberanis, Maldonado, Alarc6n Monsanto,1 15
Linares and Cifuentes, among others."1 16
Table 3.2. Labor Ministers 1986 - 2004
Minister of Labor Years in Office Number of Years in Office President
Ana Catalina Soberanis 1986-1988 3 years Cerezo (DCG)
Rodolfo Maldonado Ruiz 1988-1989 1 year Cerezo (DCG)
Mario Sol6rzano 1990-1993 4 years Serrano (MAS)
Gladys Morfin 1993-1996 3 years De Leon
Arnoldo Moscoso Ortiz 1996 1 year Arzd (PAN)
Hector Adolfo Cifuentes 1997-1998 1 year Arzi (PAN)
Luis Linares 1998-2000 2 years Arz6 (PAN)
Juan Francisco Alfaro 2000-2001 2 years Portillo (FRG)
Victor Hugo Godoy 2002 1 year Portillo (FRG)
Victor Moreira 2003 1 year Portillo (FRG)
Second, many of the predecessors of the FRG Ministers shared similar Weberian traits:
they were experienced leaders with long careers and exceptional knowledge not only
pertaining to labor, but also to other economic and social issues affecting workers.
Minister Solbrzano, for instance, was a presidential candidate for the Social Democratic
Party in 1990 and one of the most influential Ministers in the Serrano (1991-1993)
cabinet (Dosal 1995). Similarly, Minister Soberanis was the head of the Christian
Democratic Party (DCG), would move on to become the first woman President of
Congress in 1991, and would run for the Presidency of the country in 1999. A third
1s He was Minister of Labor from 1978 to 1982.
116 Interview with Victor Hugo Godoy, August 22, 2006.
example is Minister Gladys Morfin, who was Vice President of Congress before being
named Minister of Labor.117
Therefore, this thesis claims that labor-embedded and Weberian FRG Ministers of Labor
were a necessary but not sufficient condition for the FRG labor reforms. The three labor-
embedded and Weberian FRG Ministers of Labor, especially Ministers Alfaro and
Moreira, initiated discussions and pushed for the labor reforms within the Executive and
in the Legislature. However, as the cases of several of the previous Ministers of Labor
attest, such labor-embeddedness and Weberianness was not enough to advance labor
reforms in Guatemala.
The role of the Big Boys and their Followers in the CACIF
In addition to U.S. trade pressures and labor-embedded, Weberian FRG Ministers of
Labor, the commitment of the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF to national-
level democracy was central to the FRG's decision to implement the labor reforms. This
democratic commitment meant that the FRG administration could enact and implement
the labor reforms - and exclude the Big Boys and CACIF from the Executive - without
fearing a Big Boy and CACIF-organized coup. Until the 1980s, the Big Boys and the
CACIF used coup threats to deter military and elected governments from implementing
economic and social policies that they did not support. However, in the 1980s and 1990s,
they abandoned this coup-threat strategy for two reasons: first, throughout most of the
period between 1954 and the 1980s, they had ruled the country in alliance with the
"7 Frundt (1998) explains that "Although less experienced than Sol6rzano, Minister Gladys Morfin brought
more competent administration to the Labor Ministry" (152).
military. However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, their alliance came under intense
pressure as the goal of the "modernizing""18 military faction in government of
redistributing wealth to weaken popular support for the guerrilla conflicted with the
interests of the Big Boys and the CACIF, who wished to maintain their economic power.
During this period, the military governments (i.e. Kjell Laugerud (1974 - 1978) and
Efrain Rios Montt (1982 - 1983)) consistently excluded the Big Boys and the CACIF
from government policy-making. Given this experience, the Big Boys and their CACIF
followers understood the risks of an alliance with the military (Merskyl988; Beard
2001). This understanding cemented their commitment to democracy as they concluded
that democracy allowed more channels of influence over government policy. The Big
Boys and their followers in the CACIF continued influencing political and economic
government decisions through positions in government ministries (as a result of
campaign financing); participation of CACIF chambers in a variety of government bodies
(Beard (2001) argues that "CACIF had representation on the boards on 27 government
bodies, including the Monetary Board, the Guatemalan Social Security Institute, and the
National Salary Commission."); direct contact of the most powerful businessmen with
influential public servants in the three branches of government; control of mass media;
and outright bribery (Segovia 2006; Schneider forthcoming, Palencia 2002). Moreover,
even if these channels of influence for the Big Boys and their followers were not open
during democratically elected government, at the very least democracy ensured that
118 As explained before, the "modernizing" factions of the military supported a 70/30 view of the internal
conflict: it focused "70 percent of its effort on recovering war refugees through development projects
('Beans') while using 30 percent of the effort for repressive methods ('Bullets') against those the army
viewed as 'lost' (Schirmer 1998, 23).
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"hostile" administrations (i.e. administrations implementing economic and social policies
opposed by the Big Boys and their CACIF followers) would change after four years.
The second reason why the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF favored a return
to democracy follows from the changing economic conditions of the country. With the
collapse of the Central American Common Market (CACM) in the early 1980s, the
governments of the mid 1980s and 1990s, with the support of most of the economic elites
(i.e. Big Boys, industrial elites, commercial elites, financial elites, and to a lesser extent
agrarian elites - all of them represented in the CACIF), replaced the Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) model with an economic model based on economic liberalization
and export orientation to markets beyond the Central American borders (Dosal 1995).
Democracy was prerequisite for access to these markets, especially in the case of the U.S.
market. As the 1993 Serrano dissolution of Congress, usually referred to as a "self-
coup," proved, the U.S. market was not open to the country if it continued along a path of
authoritarian rule (Dosal 1995; Palencia and Valdez 1998; Spohn 2002). When Serrano
dissolved Congress and declared his self-coup, the U.S. immediately revoked
Guatemala's trade preferences under the GSP and CBI
The changes in the economic conditions which favored democracy, namely the collapse
of ISI and the adoption of a new, export-oriented model, also accelerated a structural
change that affected the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF during the 1980s and
1990s: diversification from coffee production and a few protected manufacturing
industries, into non-traditional exports, sugar production, and services and commerce.
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The most important shift probably involved the collapse of the coffee-based economic
elite, especially after 1999 (see Figure 3 -1),119 as one of the dominant economic elites in
the country (some of the Big Boys originated in coffee); and the concurrent rise of the
agro-industrial sugar,12 non-traditional (including garment and textiles and non-
traditional agricultural products such as fruit and horticulture) 12 1 and commercial elites
(see Figure 3-2) 122 (Mersky 1988; Segovia 2004 and 2006). All of these new sectors are
represented in the CACIF and many of them were captured by the Big Boys (most of the
rest of the businesses in the new sectors follow the Big Boys). The Big Boys, which are
family-held conglomerates originating in agriculture, began expanding and diversifying
into industry, commerce and services during the period of import substitution
industrialization (ISI) (1958m12 - 1980s). More recently, they entered non-traditional
sectors such as garment and textile production. Today, the Big Boys (Segovia 2006) are
119 Between 1999 and 2001, exports of coffee from Guatemala declined by more than 40% (Banco de
Guatemala 2007). The crisis responded to a sharp decline in world coffee prices. The coffee crisis
severely undermined Big Boys and CACIF power, since, as several authors claim, a large majority of them
originated in the coffee sector in the period following the Liberal Revolution of 1871 (Dosal 1995;
Cambranes 1985).
120 The sugar sector began its expansion in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a result of the confluence of
two events. First, a modernizing group of recent university graduates took control of production of one of
the largest sugar mills in the country, and implemented an aggressive expansion program (Interview with
Anonymous Government Commissioner, July 25, 2006). Second, a massive strike broke out in the sugar
plantations in 1980s and convinced the sugar barons that changes were necessary (Oglesby 2001). These
two events resulted in a rapid, industry-wide production upgrading process which by the late 1990s had
tripled production, doubled the amount of land dedicated to sugar growing, and situated Guatemala as the
sixth largest producer of sugar in the world (Oglesby 2001). This sharp growth in production increased the
power of sugar barons within CACIF, allowing them to become the first association to have a seat in the
CACIF board (until then, only sectoral chambers, as opposed to industry associations, were represented).
121 Non-traditional products received their first boost from the Caribbean Basin Initiative, approved by the
U.S. in the early 1980s, which created preferential trade treatment for non-traditional exports (Frundt
1998). In addition, U.S. AID funded a series of programs to strengthen the non-traditional sector and its
association, AGEXPRONT, in Guatemala (Escoto and Marroquin 1993; Valdez and Palencia 1998;
Interview with Fernando Valdez, July 26, 2006). Finally, Decree 29-89, approved during the Cerezo
administration (1986 - 1990), provided important fiscal incentives for exports, especially maquila (Ley de
Fomento y Desarrollo de la Actividad Exportadora y de Maquila 1989).
122 The commercial sector greatly benefited from the dismantling of ISI and the associated reduction in
import tariffs. As Dosal (1995) explains, the commercial sector constantly clashed with the industrial
sector in the post 1950 period, since industrialists favored protection while commercial sector businesses
imported many of their goods and thus opposed protectionism.
123 The Central American Common Market (CACM) was created in 1958.
102
in a class of their own, apart from the rest of the business sector in Guatemala. They
define CACIF positions124 since they control most chambers,125 and also affect
government policy through informal channels (i.e. direct contacts with top government
officials).
Figure 3-1 Coffee Exports as Percent of Total Exports
Source: Banco de Guatemala
124Small firms in Guatemala are generally unorganized and medium-sized firms represented in the CACIF
simply have to follow the conditions defined by these large conglomerates (Interview with Francisco Reyes
Lopez, March 19, 2007; interview with Anonymous Academic 1, July 26, 2006; Segovia 2004 and 2006).
125 Although the Big Boys control the chambers, the day to day activities of these chambers are in the hands
of Big Boy-friendly managers, rather than Big Boy family heads (Segovia 2004; interview with Francisco
Reyes Lopez, March 19, 2007; interview with Anonymous Academic 1, July 26, 2006).
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Figure 3-2 Services 126 and Commerce as Percent of GDP
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Returning to the process of diversification, much of the literature on production
upgrading and labor conditions describes diversification as leading to improved national-
level economic conditions for workers. Paige (1975 and 1997) argues that that the
transformation from agrarian production to agro-industrial production entails a move
from zero-sum to positive-sum relation between employers and employees: in agrarian
production, employers depended on control over land and peasants to maintain their
position. Thus, agrarian employers could not allow labor condition improvements that
could encourage "proleterianized" workers to challenge the status quo and the agrarian
elite's continued political domination over the land and workers (the type of worker
mobilization that happened in El Salvador in the 1930s, resulting in the well-known
"Matanza"). In agro-industry, such control is not necessary, since increased profits do
not come from the land nor from low labor costs, but rather from increased productivity
126 Not including banking and financial services.
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and capital investments. Therefore, Paige argues, agro-industrialists can "indulge" in
providing workers with better conditions. With this in mind, Paige predicted that labor
wages and conditions would improve following the upgrading process from agrarian to
agro-industrial production. This conclusion is partially true in Guatemala. Each of the
economic elites in the new sectors displays more labor-friendly attitudes than the
agrarian, coffee elites. Sugar producers, sustained by a highly productive workforce, pay
the highest wages in the agrarian sector and provide workers with housing, and health,
nutrition and literacy programs through their foundation, FUNDAZUCAR (Oglesby
2001). 127 Non-traditional agricultural producers, many of them organized in
cooperatives, are seen by the leader of one of the largest peasant union organizations as
having a better employer-employee relation.128 Investors 129 in garment production or
maquila, have an "exit" option that curbs their opposition to labor reform; because they
are relatively footloose, if they disagree with labor policy, they can simply leave the
country. 3 0 Finally, the commerce sector has been interested in improving wages as a
way to expand domestic demand for their imported products since the 1871 Liberal
Revolution (Cambranes 1985).
At the same time, despite the widespread understanding that the sugar, non-traditional
and commercial sectors are more labor-friendly than their coffee-based predecessors, the
rise of CACIF elites in these new economic sectors - and expansion of the Big Boys into
127 Interview with Anonymous Government Commissioner, July 26, 2001; interview with Anonymous
Labor Lawyer, August 16, 2006; and interview with Anonymous Businessman, August 15, 2006).
128 Interview with Anonymous Labor Unionist 3, August 1, 2006.
129 A majority of those investing in maquila are Korean (Pipkin 2006).
130 An interviewee also explained that; while supporting the development of the non-traditional sector in
Guatemala, U.S. AID also tried to instill a "modernizing" mentality in non-traditional exporters (Interview
with Anonymous Academic 1, July 26, 2006).
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these sectors - did not enhance national labor regulation enforcement, and certainly
cannot explain the FRG reforms. First, important labor reforms did not precede nor
follow the FRG administration, even though the process of elite restructuring started
before the FRG government and has continued since. Had there been a true change in the
position of the Big Boys and CACIF regarding labor, their rise to economic leadership
would have translated into improved national policy on labor regulation enforcement.
As a matter of fact, at least two of the new economic elites, those involved in sugar and
non-traditional exports, as well as several of the Big Boys, openly supported both the
Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) administration that preceded the FRG government,
and the Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA) administration that followed it. Not only did the
sugar and nontraditional sector elites, and the Big Boys, provide financial support for the
GANA and PAN electoral campaigns, but they also staffed many of the two
administrations' Ministries. In the case of the GANA administration, they even staffed
the Ministry of Labor.13' However, neither the PAN administration that preceded the
FRG administration, nor the GANA administration that followed it implemented far-
reaching labor reforms. On the contrary, the GANA administration even rolled back
some of the FRG administration's labor reforms.
A second reason why the Big Boys and the new economic elites of the CACIF were not
behind the FRG reform concerns their lack of involvement in the FRG administration's
131 Minister Gallardo has been linked to one of the Big Boys, the Castillo conglomerate, as he worked with
a leading Castillo businessman and politician (Interview with Anonymous Labor Lawyer, August 16,
2006).
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policies. As attested by a number of interviewees 32 and even by GANA President
Berger in his 2004 acceptance speech (Berger 2004), the FRG administration and the Big
Boys and the new economic elites in the CACIF constantly disagreed and clashed over
economic and social policy, especially in terms of fiscal, trade and labor policy. In each
of theses policy areas the FRG implemented important reforms, and in each the Big Boys
and the CACIF failed to participate. The Big Boys and the CACIF were not indulging in
labor reforms, but instead consistently attacked the FRG Executive and Legislature for
them.
Yet the fact that the Big Boys and new economic elites in the CACIF did not lead the
FRG reforms does not mean that they did not play a role in their ratification. As
described above, the Big Boys and the CACIF were important for the FRG reforms
because of their commitment to democracy. Regardless of whether the Big Boys' and
their CACIF followers' commitment to democracy was ideological or merely functional
(i.e. they needed it to ensure access to export markets), it allowed the FRG Executive and
Legislature to rest assured that the labor reforms would not elicit an armed coup. In the
pre-democratic era, one of the simplest ways for the CACIF to pressure any
administration to enact CACIF-friendly policies was to threaten with a coup. In fact,
Rios Montt, the FRG leader and President of Congress, was himself deposed by a
CACIF-backed armed military coup in 1983 after he refused to bow before CACIF
pressures. However, as Rios Montt and the FRG leadership were keenly aware, this was
no longer the case after the FRG's Alfonso Portillo became President in January 2000.
132 Interview with Guido Ricci, August 25, 2006; interview with Carlos Arias, July 31, 2006; interview with
Eduardo Weyman, July 28, 2006; and interview with Victor Moreira, August 9, 2006.
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The Big Boys and their CACIF followers would not disrupt the popularly elected
government. 133
The Unifying and Enhancing Role of a Shielded FRG Executive
Therefore, U.S. trade pressures, a Big Boy and CACIF democratic commitment, and
labor-embedded, Weberian Ministers of Labor were all present before, during and after
the FRG administration. What differentiated the FRG government from its predecessors
and successor was the exclusion of the Big Boys and CACIF from the Executive - the
shielded FRG Executive. This shielding provided space for the Weberian, labor-
embedded Ministers of Labor to enact and implement the labor reforms, and enhanced
the effectiveness of the U.S. support for the reforms. Additionally, the commitment of
the Big Boys and their followers to democracy ensured that the FRG administration could
remain shielded from their influences and pressures without facing an armed coup.
Within the FRG shielded Executive, Weberian Ministers of Labor embedded in the labor
and broader human rights movement could implement labor reforms if they successfully
garnered the support of the majority of the cabinet and the Legislative majority block.
The three Labor Ministers of the FRG, especially Ministers Alfaro and Moreira, were
able to obtain this support for at least four reasons: first, the constant clash between the
FRG administration and the Big Boys and CACIF created a desire by FRG leaders to
133 In addition to their commitment to democracy, the Big Boys and the CACIF faced an additional hurdle
if they intended to carry out a coup: as explained above, the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996 signified
a Big Boy and CACIF - military break. In the Accords, the majority of the Big Boys and the CACIF
withdrew their support for the military elite even though both of them had worked together since the 1954
Counter-Revolution that deposed President Arbenz. Therefore, if the Big Boys and their followers in the
CACIF had been interested in organizing a coup, they could not have counted with the support of the
military.
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punish these Big Boys and their CACIF followers. The labor reforms could be used for
this purpose. As the U.S. labor attache explained, "[The FRG administration and the Big
Boys and CACIF] were adversaries and [the FRG] used the Labor Ministry as a
politically motivated weapon... It was all politically motivated to harass [FRG]
opponents."' 3 4
Second, the FRG could use the labor reforms to create an advantage for its protected
renegade elite. As an interviewee who participated in the FRG government related, the
FRG used the State as a "grabbing hand" to benefit its supporters.' 3 5 Selective
enforcement of the labor reforms increased the risks and costs for those opposing the
FRG, since they were commonly targeted for inspections. It also benefited those who
supported the administration because they did not have to fear the inspectors.' 36
Third, the labor reforms could expand the FRG's urban electoral base since they
benefited urban workers, many of them impoverished by the Washington Consensus. 3 7
In this sense, the FRG reforms can be seen as an example of the second of Polanyi's
(1944) "double movement" (the first movement being the push toward a free market,
especially in labor), which as Piore and Schrank (2006a) explain, "is an response, an
attempt to protect society from [the pressures of the market]... the second movement is
visceral, an instinctive effort to rescue society from the ravages of unfettered economic
134 Telephone interview with Anonymous U.S. Labor Attache, July 21, 2007.
135 Interview with Anonymous FRG Minister, March 16, 2007.
136 In addition, most of the renegade elite held investments in capital intensive industries which would not
be as affected by increased labor regulation enforcement.
137 As explained in the previous sections, while he was Chief of State between 1982 and 1983, FRG leader
Rios Montt pursued a similar strategy to garner support for his military government.
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competition and the constant redeployment of resources that destroys the context in
which people understand themselves and create meaning and purpose in their lives"
(Piore and Schrank 2006a, http://bostonreview.net/BR31.5/pioreschrank.html)
According to Ministry of Labor data, almost half of all inspections in 2003 and 2004
were carried out in Industry. The other half focused on Services and Commerce. In
addition, data from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos (ENEI) employment
surveys shows that most urban workers are involved in industry, services or commerce.
Thus, most of the inspections targeted urban work centers and benefited urban workers.
Finally, the FRG labor reforms ensured increased support from the international
community, which hesitated to back a party directed by human-rights violator Rios
Montt. For the U.S. government, the combination of a shielded Executive and a labor-
embedded, Weberian Minister of Labor with support from the cabinet created the
opportunity to obtain tangible improvements in labor enforcement. As detailed above,
U.S. pressures played a crucial role in ensuring the labor reforms' Legislative approval.
The exclusion of the Big Boys and CACIF from the FRG Executive and the commitment
of the Labor Ministers to labor reform opened new channels which U.S. trade pressures
could navigate to multiply their effectiveness.
Also important, FRG supporters did not oppose the reforms. On the one hand, the
renegade elite benefited from the increased costs and risks to the economic elite
organized in the CACIF. The risks and costs associated with the reforms weakened the
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Big Boys and their CACIF followers. Their weakening created new opportunities for
increased economic and political influence for the renegade elites, which were also
clustered in capital intensive industries and thus would not be severely hurt by increased
labor regulation enforcement. On the other hand, the military was unaffected by the
reforms, as a completely different set of labor regulations prevails within the Armed
Forces. Additionally, the reforms mostly targeted the urban, non-Indigenous workers,
not the rural workers. During the Civil War, most of the military repression took place in
rural areas against Indigenous peasants, where the military strategy envisioned control
over the population as the way to defeat the guerrillas. However, military control was
much less in urban areas, and thus the military was not as sensitive to reforms that
potentially enhanced worker mobilization in these areas. Most importantly, however, the
military was focused on increasing its budget and ensuring the continued survival of the
EMP, which the FRG administration guaranteed. Therefore, both groups of supporters
went along with the FRG labor reforms.
Final Remarks
In sum, the success of the FRG administration in implementing the labor reforms is
explained by the FRG's exclusion of the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF from
the Executive. The FRG was able to win the 1999 election and exclude the Big Boys and
CACIF from the Executive because of the support of two groups - a renegade economic
elite and the military. Each of these two groups had its own objectives which it sought to
fulfill in the FRG government. Within this shielded FRG Executive, labor-embedded and
Weberian Ministers of Labor succeeded in gaining the support for the labor reforms
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because cabinet and Congress members wanted to punish opposing Big Boys and
CACIF, benefit supporting renegade elites, obtain increased electoral backing in urban
areas, and garner support from the international community. In fact, the Ministers of
Labor's crusade was strengthened by the trade pressures of the U.S. government, which
saw its influence magnified during the FRG administration. Moreover, FRG cabinet
members did not fear a coup, as the Big Boys and CACIF were wholly committed to
democracy and had broken their alliance with the military.
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Conclusion
The history of Guatemala until 2000 is filled with examples of the country's infamous
inability to uphold labor rights and labor regulation. Until 1944, forced labor was legal.
Between the 1950s and 1980s, employers and employer-friendly military governments
consistently repressed workers and unions. From the 1980s through the 1990s, the so-
called Washington Consensus was implemented in full force, leading to what Polanyi
(1944) would have referred to as "social dislocation and the disruption of the fabric of
society." During this time, Guatemala received continual international complaints
regarding poor labor regulation enforcement by the State. For instance, between 1986
and 2001, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) revised Guatemala's trade
preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) programs more times than any other Latin American country's
preferences. His reviews came in response to petitions by labor-related organizations
denouncing inadequate labor regulation enforcement and constant labor rights abuse in
the country. In sum, the Guatemalan State's record on defending labor rights and
enforcing labor regulation is far from satisfactory.
In the 1940s, Polanyi (1944) highlighted the role of the State in preventing the unbridled
forces of the market from bringing social dislocation and the disruption of the fabric of
society - what Polanyi refers to as the second movement of the "double movement."
Polanyi argued that this second movement was important to protect thefabric of society,
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and also showed that it was crucial in ensuring the creation of functioning national
markets (Chauhdry 1993). More recently, literature on Latin America has focused on the
region's governments' current push toward increased labor market State regulation not
only to prevent social dislocation following the so-called Washington Consensus (Piore
and Scrhank 2006a and 2006b; Murillo and Scrhank 2005), but also to promote economic
development by seeking to "reconcile the public's demand for protection with the
market's demand for efficiency" (Piore and Schrank 2006b, 4). As this literature shows,
governments throughout Latin America are carrying both de jure and de facto labor
reforms to enhance the regulatory capacity of the State apparatus in the labor market.
Yet, in Guatemala, the election of the government of the Frente Republicano
Guatemalteco (FRG) in late 1999 did not seem to fit within this recent Latin America
literature. Founded by former Chief of State and notorious human rights violator Efrain
Rios Montt, the FRG party was described by Jonas (2000) as "ultra-rightist" (44) because
of its close links to the military. Moreover, through its political and economic decisions
between 2000 and 2004 (e.g. tariff reductions, interference in military internal affairs,
dramatic cabinet changes), the FRG government only seemed to lose supporters.
Constant clashes with the seven or eight largest conglomerates in the country accounting
for more than 20% of GDP, "the Big Boys," and their followers in the peak business
organization Comite de Organizaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y
Financieras (CACIF) tarnished the FRG's public image. A severe economic recession,
escalating crime rates and widespread charges of corruption eroded the FRG
government's support.
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Surprisingly, as this thesis has shown, despite its many problems the FRG administration
enacted and implemented two far-reaching labor reforms, which not only resulted in
significant improvements in the State's enforcement of labor regulation, but which, for
the most part, also survived the transition from the FRG to the more Big Boy and
CACIF-friendly Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA) government (2004 - 2008). Susan
Jonas (2000) writes about Guatemala,
"Every time I catch a glimpse of a better future, my hopes will be dashed.
And every time I begin the inevitable descent into despair, Guatemala will
save itself, somehow, in the most unimaginable way" (Jonas 2000, 1).
Her words seem eerily appropriate to describe both the government of a party of which
she is strongly critical, the FRG, as well as the survival of its reforms in the GANA
period. At the same time, this thesis has shed light on the process of enactment,
implementation and preservation of the FRG labor reforms, making the way in which
Guatemala "saved itself' more "imaginable."
The first of the two FRG labor reforms was a legal reform to the Labor Code which
attained four large objectives: first, it legalized agricultural workers' right to strike;
second, it strengthened the Labor Inspection's (IGT) enforcement capacity by endowing
it with the responsibility to impose fines on noncompliant firms - a responsibility
previously reserved for the Labor Courts - and by raising fine rates; third, it reinforced
and streamlined the legal mechanisms governing the organization of labor unions,
eliminating cumbersome Labor Code requirements for union formation and limiting State
intervention in internal union affairs such as financial accounting; and fourth, it required
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the central government to set minimum wages yearly. The second was an
administrative reform to the IGT which increased the IGT budget by 40%; raised the
number of labor inspectors by more than 80%, from 160 to 292; created a publicity
campaign to inform workers about their labor rights; established two specialized
inspector units for underage, and garment and textile work; and institutionalized an
internship program for San Carlos University (USAC) last-year law students to work in
the Ministry of Labor and the IGT.
Together, the FRG labor reforms resulted in a number of positive outcomes in terms of
worker wages and the capacity of the State to enforce labor regulation. Regarding the
latter, first, the amount of fines imposed by the State on noncompliant firms increased
more than seven-fold between 2001 and 2003, from about Q.900 thousand to Q. 7.4
million. Second, in this same period, the amount in fines collected by the Guatemalan
State multiplied by more than 25 times, from Q.50 thousand to Q.1.5 million. Third,
during the FRG government, the number of cases of firms found in non-compliance
settled by the Labor Inspection (IGT) rose almost seven-fold, from 136 to 923. In terms
of worker wages, the most evident effect revolved around minimum wages. The FRG
administration raised them every year of its term, increasing the real value of agricultural
and non-agricultural minimum wages by 24% and 33% respectively between 2000 and
2004. No other administration has ever raised minimum wages in each of its four years
in office.
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This thesis explained how the FRG's unique exclusion of the Big Boy and CACIF from
the Executive - the shielding of the Executive - played a crucial role in the labor reform
process, since these economic elites opposed reform efforts to enhance the State's
capacity to enforce labor market regulation. Unlike any of the other democratically-
elected governments of Guatemala since 1986, the FRG Executive was not permeated by
the influences and pressures of the Big Boys and their followers. In the governments
preceding the FRG, as well as in the Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA) government that
followed it, the Big Boys had direct access to policy-making through appointments of
their employees and of loyal CACIF representatives to Ministerial and high level
Executive positions; and through informal meetings with the highest ranking government
officials, including the President - what Segovia (2006) refers to as the "door-knocker
right." However, unlike its predecessors and successor government, the FRG placed
these traditional Big Boy/CACIF - State practices on hold, refusing to open the
Executive to the Big Boys' influences and pressures.
To exclude the Big Boys and the CACIF from the Executive, and counterweight their
economic and, more importantly, political power, the FRG depended crucially on its two
main sources of support: the military and the renegade elite. Both of these actors
provided campaign funds as well as voters, and populated the FRG government offices.
The military supported the FRG because it disagreed with many of the defense policies of
the Big Boy-friendly PAN government (1996 - 2000) that preceded the FRG (the PAN
was also the FRG's main opponent in the 1999 elections). The military was looking to
increase its political power, which had been on the decline since the Peace Accords of
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1996. Military leaders perceived that the FRG was a viable option to achieve these
objectives, especially because FRG leader Rios Montt was a member of the Armed
Forces. Meanwhile, the renegade elite looked to the FRG as a way to obtain valuable
government benefits. Treated by the Big Boys and their CACIF followers as second
class businessmen, and being economically much weaker than the Big Boys, the renegade
elite hoped to obtain government benefits from the FRG not available to them in periods
of Big Boy and CACIF-friendly governments: Ministerial positions, government
contracts for public works, and beneficial tariff changes that hurt their competitors,
among others.
In addition to the role of its two bastions of support, the FRG Executive could also rest
assured that it could remain shielded from the Big Boys and their followers in the
CACIF, because the Big Boys and the CACIF no longer resorted to a practice used in the
past to affect government policy: the threat of an armed coup. The Big Boys and their
followers could not organize a coup for two reasons: first, in contrast to the past, when
production was less dependent on international markets, after the 1990s a break in
democracy was incommensurable with the Big Boys' and CACIF export activities.
Export markets such as the U.S. market would immediately be closed to Guatemalan
products in the case of a return to authoritarianism (i.e. U.S. government credible
commitment). Second, during the 1996 Peace Accords negotiations, the Big Boys and
their followers severed their alliance with the military, and thus could no longer rely on
the Armed Institution to organize a coup. Not only did the Big Boys and CACIF turn
their back on the military during the Peace Accord negotiations, but they also reduced the
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military's political and economic power during the Big Boy and CACIF-friendly PAN
administration (1996 - 2000). Thus, the Big Boys and their CACIF followers succeeded
in turning the Armed Forces into an opposing camp.
Therefore, while in government, the FRG Executive was practically impervious to Big
Boy and CACIF pressures and influences. Within this shielded Executive, labor
"embedded (Evans 1989), "Weberian" (Evans and Rauch 1999) Ministers of Labor, with
the support of the Vice President, could push for the labor reforms, garnering support
from both Executive and Legislative branch FRG leaders. Crucial in this regard was the
support of the U.S. government through its ambassador: using the threat of U.S. trade
sanctions, the U.S. ambassador helped the FRG Labor Ministers and Vice President
convince the remaining members of the FRG Executive, and then the FRG
representatives in Congress, most notably Congress President Rios Montt, of the
importance of ratifying and implementing the labor reforms. As this thesis argues,
although much of the literature on the effects of international trade on developing country
labor conditions draws a direct connection between trade sanctions and improved labor
conditions, the Guatemalan case shows that the relationship between these two variables
is more complex: U.S. government trade pressures depend on domestic government
channels (e.g. Ministers of Labor, the Vice-President, etc.) to effectively affect labor
policy. In governments permeated by the Big Boys and CACIF, these private sector
elites managed to almost completely seal these channels. However, because the FRG
excluded the Big Boys and their CACIF followers from the Executive, U.S. trade
pressures could navigate these government channels more effectively.
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To conclude as noted previously, a second surprise of this thesis, in addition the FRG's
enacting and implementing of the labor reforms, was most of the reforms' survival in the
post-FRG government of the Big Boy and CACIF-friendly GANA. This thesis claims
that to explain the GANA's decision to keep some of the reforms, one must look to the
unique conjuncture at the time: the U.S. Congress was debating whether to approve the
United States - Dominican Republic Central America Free Trade Agreement (US - DR
CAFTA or CAFTA). Union groups, trade associations and consumer groups, who were
furiously lobbying to block the agreement, were using Guatemala's labor record as an
anti-CAFTA argument. Thus, the Guatemalan GANA government had to prove that
labor conditions and labor regulation enforcement had improved in Guatemala. To show
this, it kept some of the FRG labor reforms which ironically, the GANA's heavy-weight
constituents, the Big Boys and their followers in the CACIF, had strongly opposed while
the FRG Executive was pushing to implement them.
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Appendix
Interviews
Name Position Affiliation
Francisco Reyes L6pez Vice-President Frente Republicano
Guatemalteco
Eduardo Weyman Economic Minister Frente Republicano
and Finance Minister Guatemalteco
Victor Hugo Godoy Labor Minister Frente Republicano
Guatemalteco
Victor Moreira Labor Minister Frente Republicano
Guatemalteco
Anonymous Minister Minister Frente Republicano
Guatemalteco
Anonymous Vice-Minister of Vice-Minister Frente Republicano
Labor Guatemalteco
Anonymous Government Government Gran Alianza Nacional
Commissioner Commissioner
Luis Linares Labor Minister Partido de Avanzada Nacional
Roberto Ard6n Director Comit6 de Asociaciones
Agricolas, Comerciales,
Industriales y Financieras
Carlos Arias Labor Commission Comit6 de Asociaciones
Agricolas, Comerciales,
Industriales y Financieras
Guido Ricci Labor Commission Comit6 de Asociaciones
Agricolas, Comerciales,
Industriales y Financieras
Anonymous Businessman Businessman Comit6 de Asociaciones
Agricolas, Comerciales,
Industriales y Financieras
Anonymous Labor Unionist 1 Unionist Federaci6n Sindical de
Trabajadores de la Alimentaci6n
y Similares
Anonymous Labor Unionist 2 Unionist Centro para Acci6n Legal en
Derechos Humanos
Anonymous Labor Unionist 3 Unionist Confederaci6n de Trabajadores
del Campo
Anonymous Labor Unionist 4 Unionist Federaci6n Sindical de
Empleados Bancarios y Servicios
Anonymous Labor Unionist 5 Unionist Federaci6n Sidical de
Empleados Bancarios y Servicios
Anonymous Labor Unionist 6 Unionist Confederaci6n de Unidad
Sindical de Guatemala
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Anonymous Labor Unionist 7 Unionist Confederaci6n de Unidad
Sindical de Guatemala
Anonymous Labor Unionist 8 Unionist Uni6n Sindical de Trabajadores
de Guatemala
Anonymous Labor Unionist 9 Unionist Uni6n Sindical de Trabajadores
de Guatemala
Anonymous Labor Unionist 10 Unionist AFL Solidarity Center
Anonymous Labor Unionist 11 Unionist AFL Solidarity Center
Alejandro Argueta Labor Lawyer
Anonymous Labor Lawyer Labor Lawyer Unions
Ricardo Changala Labor Lawyer International Community in
Guatemala
Francisco Mendoza Coordinator of Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Sociopolitical and
Labor Union Areas
Anonymous Academic 1 Academic Universidad Rafael Landfvar
Anonymous Academic 2 Academic Facultad Latinoamericana de
Ciencias Sociales
Anonymous Academic 3 Academic
Anonymous Academic 4 Academic Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Anonymous Academic 5 Academic Soros Foundation
Anonymous Peasant Organizer Peasant Organizer Coordinadora Nacional Indigena
1 y Campesina
Anonymous Peasant Organizer Peasant Organizer Coordinadora Nacional Indigena
2 y Campesina
Anonymous Labor U.S. Labor Attach6 U.S. Embassy in Guatemala
Attach6
Anonymous Labor Inspector 1 Labor Inspector Labor Inspection
Anonymous Labor Inspector 2 Labor Inspector Labor Inspection
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